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Chapter 1: Court-Ordered Campaign Finance Deregulation and Stock
Value of Contributors
1.1 Introduction
How influential is money in U.S. politics? Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and
Snyder (2003) summarize a large body of literature studying the effects of campaign
contributions by political action committees (PACs) of corporations on roll call
voting in Congress. Despite the public perception of massive influence, evidence
for the causal effects from money to legislation is weak at best in the literature. As
they argue, studies of this kind typically suffer from the problem of reverse causality.
Interest group money tends to flow to candidates and members of Congress who are
already aligned with the interests of those contributors. This creates a positive bias
to OLS estimates of the effects of campaign contributions on legislative voting.
Studying the relationship between campaign contributions and roll call voting
may not be a good way to identify the effect of money on politics for other reasons
beside reverse causality. First, roll call voting may be a poor outcome measure.
Roll call voting occurs in the last stage of legislation. Given that most bills do not
reach the House or Senate floor for a vote, the best way to bury an unfavorable
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bill arguably is to make sure that it does not get out to the floor in the first place.
Anecdotally, many parliamentary maneuvers can be deployed to doom a bill or to
substantially change the content of a bill before a floor vote. Moreover, when a
floor vote occurs, the bill is often passed or defeated by a large margin. As no vote
is pivotal in these cases, the votes need not reflect the interests of special interest
groups.
Second, the amounts of campaign contributions are potentially noisy measures
of the influence of money on politics. There are alternative means of political spend-
ing, such as independent expenditures and lobbying. Even for campaign contribu-
tions, the electoral value of a certain level of spending depends on a set of factors
such as timing, how competitive the race is, and the price of campaign ads in the
local media market. Campaign contributions may have an unobserved shadow value
from the implicit threats of funding a candidate’s opponents (Chamon and Kaplan,
2013) and may be a strategic substitute for the electoral power an interest group
has from its local membership (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011). These factors vary
substantially from candidate to candidate and are difficult to control for. Given
that the impacts of campaign contributions on roll call voting may be small, one
would worry about attenuation biases in the estimates. In sum, the relationship
between campaign contributions and roll call voting may not be very informative
for understanding the influence of money in U.S. politics.
Campaign finance regulation is the most frequent solution proposed to limit
the potential distortions that money in politics brings to policy making. By limiting
transfers of resources from interest groups to politicians, campaign finance regula-
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tions may achieve a policy-making process that is biased less toward special interest
groups. In this paper, I use an event study approach to overcome the difficulties
of identifying a causal impact of political spending by corporations on a favorable
legislative environment. I examine the changes in the stock values of firms that had
contributed to congressional elections around the dates of key developments in three
Supreme Court cases concerning the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).
The BCRA addressed two issues in campaign finance, namely soft money
and independent expenditures on issue ads for electoral advocacy (“electioneering
communications”). Soft money refers to contributions to national parties for the
purposes of general party-building, which are not subject to contribution limits.
Independent expenditures on “electioneering communications” are expenditures by
corporations on broadcast communications, which clearly identify a candidate but
are made without coordinating with the candidate. The constitutionality of key
provisions of the BCRA were challenged in three cases presented to the Supreme
Court. In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003), hereafter McConnell,
most of the provisions of BCRA were upheld. In Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007), hereafter WRTL II, the BCRA’s provisions
on “electioneering communications” were weakened. In Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission (2010), hereafter Citizens United, the BCRA’s provisions on
“electioneering communications” were struck down. This decision also set a prece-
dent for allowing corporations to spend an unlimited amount of money from their
general treasuries to support or oppose a candidate.
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If relaxing constraints imposed by the BCRA on political spending by cor-
porations allows firms to obtain policies that are more favorable toward them, the
potential benefits that are otherwise difficult to measure would be capitalized into
stock prices upon the arrivals of such news. By studying the stock returns of firms
that contributed to congressional candidates in all election cycles between 2003 and
2008 on dates surrounding developments of the three cases, including granting re-
views, oral arguments, and decision announcements, I find that loosening campaign
finance regulation is positively associated with the stock value of politically active
firms. Based on a Fama-French three-factor model, stocks of politically active firms
on average have a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -0.27% over three days
coinciding with major developments of McConnell, which upheld campaign finance
restrictions. Stocks of politically active firms on average have a CAR of 0.41% over
days coinciding with major developments of WRTL II and a closely related case
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission (2006), hereafter
WRTL I. In Citizens United, the mean CAR is 1.01%. Together, these findings sug-
gest that campaign finance regulation has a substantial impact on the stock value
of contributing firms. Alternative measures of cumulative abnormal return, such as
excess returns relative to matched non-contributing firms in the same industry, yield
similar estimates. Moreover, contributing firms whose prices suggests low growth
prospects have higher abnormal returns around the Supreme Court events related
to the deregulation of political spending.
This paper adds to the literature examining the empirical relationship between
political spending and policies affecting spenders. The primary focus in this liter-
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ature to date has been on lobbying expenditures, which amount to about 10 times
what is spent on campaign contributions. Igan et al. (2011) find that lobbying
expenditure is positively associated with risk-taking behavior of banks in the period
leading up to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006)
find that lobbying expenditures by universities have large returns in the form of
academic earmarks, provided that the university is represented by a congressional
member serving on the appropriation committee of either chamber. Immigration
policy, measured in the number of visas granted to an industry, also responds to
lobbying expenditures (Facchini et al., 2011). Therefore, it appears that “money,
like water, will always find an outlet.”1 The question remains, however, of why
lobbying expenditures rather than campaign contributions are the primary outlet
for political spending. A line of work, e.g., Austen-Smith (1995), Hall and Deardorff
(2006), and Bombardini and Trebbi (2011), suggest that campaign contributions
are auxiliary to other types of political spending or influence. The findings in this
paper suggest that campaign finance regulation is at least partially responsible for
why campaign contributions do not appear to be the primary outlet for money in
politics. In the case law studied here, the type of political spending refers to in-
dependent expenditures, which may render contribution limits ineffective, and to
a lesser extent, to soft money contributions to national parties. Strict limits on
campaign contributions may force firms that want to spend on politics to spend
elsewhere, such as on lobbying. This paper contributes to the literature by using an
1Quoted from the opinion of the Court with respect to Title I and II of the BCRA in McConnell
v. FEC, written by Justices Stevens and O’Connor.
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event study approach to better identify the causal impacts of political spending. It
utilizes a better measurement of benefits to firms from political spending, though at
a cost of not discerning the channels through which the political spending increases
profits.
In a closely related paper, Ansolabehere et al. (2004) find that soft money
donors from Fortune 500 companies did not experience noticeable movement in
their stock value compared to non-donors around legislative events at the time of
the BCRA as well as the dates of the oral argument and the decision announcement
of McConnell. Several reasons may explain why my results differ from this previous
work. First, smaller firms may benefit more from political spending than larger
firms, as they do not have direct political influence resulting from a high level of
employment (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011). My sample includes a broader set of
firms that are smaller on average than the mean Fortune 500 firm.
Second, while BCRA and McConnell dealt with both soft money contribu-
tions and independent expenditures, WRTL I, WRTL II, and Citizens United fo-
cused only on independent expenditures. Soft money contributions may return few
rents to firms. This is because, as compared to individual candidates, party leaders
on the receiving end may have much better bargaining positions with firms. On
the other hand, independent expenditures could affect individual races and target
candidates via either electoral supports or threats (Chamon and Kaplan, 2013), gen-
erating a higher return on political investments. Thus, the bipartisan support for
BCRA, despite a strong objection from the Republican leadership, could be viewed
as evidence that BCRA provided a solution for legislators to their collective action
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problem against interest groups. This is consistent with my results that events of
the subsequent cases have larger impacts on the stock value of contributing firms
than events related to McConnell.
Third, the legislative events studied by Ansolabehere et al. (2004), which
include the House passage, the Senate passage, and President Bush’s signal of signing
the bill into law, may have been expected by the stock markets. Passages in both
chambers was well assured before the scheduled floor votes. After the bill was
blocked by the Committee on House Administration, a motion was filed to relinquish
the agenda-setting power of the House Committee and schedule the bill for a floor
vote. For such a motion to succeed, which has historically been rare, signatures
from an absolute majority of House members were required. These signatures were
gathered over a period of half a year. The bill was also expected to pass in the
Senate. This is because the same term of Senate had passed an earlier version of
McCain–Feingold bill in 2001, when Republicans still had the majority control in
the Senate, before Senator Jim Jeffords switched sides and handed Democrats the
majority. Moreover, while I find weak evidence for information leaks and/or build-
up of expectations prior to key developments of the Supreme Courts cases, leaks are
much more likely to be the case for legislation as the legislative process involves a
much larger number of diverse staff, in Congress as well as in the executive branch.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Ansolabehere et al. find no significant stock price
reaction to the legislative history of BCRA.
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1.2 Background
1.2.1 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its subsequent amendments
imposed legal limits and disclosure obligations on campaign contributions and po-
litical expenditures on federal elections. Contributions subject to legal limits are
referred to as hard money. However, the increasing use of so-called soft money and
issue ads for electoral advocacy over time have made these limits less relevant.
Soft money refers to funds contributed to national parties that are supposed
to be used in state and local elections and for general purpose party-building. As
a result of several rulings by the Federal Election Commission (hereafter FEC),
and by the Supreme Court in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission (1996), soft money can be legally used in a wide range
of activities. There activities are often mixed with campaigning. Figure 1.1 shows
that soft money made up a growing share of total funds raised by national parties
prior to the passage of the BCRA in 2002.
The proliferation of issue ads also weakened the effectiveness of contribution
limits. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court upheld legal limits on
campaign contributions but struck down limits on independent expenditure, which
refers to political spending that is not coordinated with a candidate. The Court
ruled that issues ads are constitutionally protected political speech and could be
financed by interest groups with an electoral purpose in mind as long as they did
8
Figure 1.1: Total Funds Raised by Party Committees by Election Cycle
Funds raised by all committees affiliated with the Democratic Party and the Republican Party;
* indicates presidential an election cycle;
Source: Center for Responsive Politics.
not explicitly coordinate with a candidate. For example, a conservative interest
group could buy ads condemning legal abortions and link their negative message
to a pro-choice candidate in order to defeat him or her. Such ads are often called
shame ads.
Mainly motivated by concerns about these two loopholes in campaign finance,
then Senators Russ Feingold and John McCain led a longtime effort to pass the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, a.k.a. the McCain–Feingold Act.2 Title I of
the BCRA bans national party committees from raising or spending money not sub-
2The Senate version did not became law. The version that became law was introduced by Rep.
Chris Shays. But the two did not differ much in substance.
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ject to contribution limits, even for state and local elections. Title II of the BCRA
defines banned corporations, unions, or unincorporated entities from using money
from their general treasuries to pay for “electioneering communications”, defined as
broadcast, cable, or satellite communications identifying a federal candidate made
within 30 days before a primary or sixty days before a general election.
1.2.2 McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
Upon the passage of the BCRA, then-Majority Whip Senator Mitch Mc-
Connell, a longtime opponent of the BCRA, immediately challenged its constitu-
tionality in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A special
three-judge panel of the District Court issued a mixed ruling. They struck down
provisions related to the soft money ban but upheld others. The ruling never went
into effect as it was immediately appealed to the Supreme Court. A section in the
BCRA mandates that any constitutional challenge to the act must be filed with
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and reviewed only by a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. This provision was originally intended to reduce un-
certainty over the application of the law during election periods. But for our purpose
of studying stock price reactions to case developments in the Supreme Court, this
feature of the BCRA is helpful in that it skips the usual appeal process at the U.S.
Court of Appeals and maintains uncertainty about the final ruling on the law. The
Supreme Court agreed to review the case on June 5, 2003 and held a three-hour
session for oral arguments on September 8, 2003. These sessions are usually one
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hour long. On December 10, 2003, the Court announced a 5-4 decision concluding
that “with two minor exceptions, the entire statute is constitutional”.3 The decision
to grant review, the oral arguments and the decision announcement are the three
events that I study for this case.
1.2.3 Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
This section considers two closely related cases, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
v. Federal Election Commission (2006), hereafter WRTL I, and Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007), namely WRTL II. Technically,
there are two separate cases, but since they involved the same parties and the
litigation was not finally settled until the Supreme Court later ruled in WRTL II, I
consider the two cases as one.
Shortly before the Wisconsin primary in 2004, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
(WRTL) began to broadcast advertisements alleging that a group of senators were
filibustering to delay and block federal judiciary nominees and urged voters to con-
tact Wisconsin Senators Feingold and Kohl to ask them not to support the filibuster.
WRTL planned to continue broadcasting in the 30-day pre-primary window and to
pay for the ads with money from their general treasury. Anticipating violation of
the BCRA provisions on “electioneering communications”, WRTL sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief by suing against the FEC. They argued that the BCRA
prohibitions were unconstitutional as applied to the three ads in question and simi-
3The opinion was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The two exceptions prohibited indi-
viduals 17 years old or younger from contributing to federal candidates or parties, and required
political parties to choose between coordinated or independent expenditures for their nominees.
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lar ads they intended to run in the future. The U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia denied a preliminary injunction and subsequently dismissed WRTL’s
case, citing reasoning in McConnell v. FEC. WRTL appealed to the Supreme Court
and was granted review on September 27, 2005. The Supreme Court heard the case
on January 17, 2006. On January 23, 2006, the Court swiftly issued a per cu-
riam decision (WRTL I) vacating the District Court’s decision, and remanded the
case back to the District Court. The opinion stated that, although the decision
in McConnell held that BCRA provisions on “electioneering communications” were
constitutional on its face, the District Court erred in concluding that the precedent
of McConnell forecloses future as-applied challenges to BCRA.4 The brief opinion,
based on very technical and narrow grounds, nevertheless opened a door for future
as-applied challenges to the BCRA.
The District Court heard the case again and ruled in favor of WRTL. The
FEC subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court and formally presented the ques-
tion of whether as-applied challenges to the prohibition of corporate financing of
“electioneering communications” are permitted and, if so, whether the prohibition
could be constitutionally applied to the ads pertaining to this case. The Supreme
Court granted review to the appellant FEC on January 19, 2007 and heard oral
arguments on April 25, 2007. On June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court announced its
5-4 decision (WRTL II) to uphold the lower court’s decision in favor of WRTL. In
the majority opinion of WRTL II, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that an ad is
4In United States v. Salerno (1987), the Court stated “A facial challenge to a legislative Act
is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”.
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eligible for exemption from prohibitions of “electioneering communications” unless
it is “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate”. Consequently, this decision weakened BCRA
regulations on “electioneering communications”. However, constitutional scholars
remain split over the extent of the decision’s impact (Briffault, 2008; Levitt, 2010;
Persily, 2010). The decision to grant review, oral arguments and decision announce-
ments in both WRTL I and WRTL II are the six events that I study from this
case.
1.2.4 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
Citizens United, a conservative ideology group, released a negative documen-
tary of Senator Hillary Clinton during her campaign for the presidency in 2008. It
was to be distributed through on-demand cable TV and as a DVD with companion
book. Citizens United intended to air the film, as well as a commercial advertising
the film, within 30 days before Democratic primaries and 60 days before the general
election if Senator Clinton had won the Democratic nomination. Anticipating viola-
tions of the BCRA provisions on “electioneering communications,” Citizens United
sought declaratory and injunctive relief at the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, arguing that the BCRA prohibition as well as disclaimers and disclo-
sure requirements could not be constitutionally applied to the film and commercial
(as-applied challenge). The District Court denied their motion and Citizens United
appealed to the Supreme Court, maintaining their as-applied challenge.
13
The Supreme Court granted review on November 14, 2008 and heard the
case on March 24, 2009. On June 29, 2009, the Court ordered the counsels to re-
argue the case on September 9, 2009 to address the question of whether the Court
should overrule either or both of the “electioneering communications” portions of
the McConnell decision and an earlier precedent, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce in 1990 (hereafter Austin), in which the Court ruled that it was consti-
tutional to restrict independent expenditures by corporations. Justice Stevens later
pointed out in his dissenting opinion that Citizens United did not adapt a position
to challenge the facial validity of the BCRA provisions on “electioneering commu-
nications” before the Supreme Court. By inviting the parties to debate the facial
constitutional validity of the BCRA provisions on “electioneering communications,”
the Court jeopardized the principle of judicial restraint. In light of this dissent,
the Court’s decision to ask for re-argument may signal an intention to overrule Mc-
Connell. For this case, the decision to grant review, initial oral arguments, the call
for re-argument, the re-argument itself, and the final decision are the five events
that I study for this case.
In the final decision of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission on
January 21st, 2010, the Supreme Court with a 5-4 majority overturned portions of
McConnell concerning “electioneering communications” and an earlier precedent,
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990). The Court ruled that corpo-
rations, for-profit or not, have a First Amendment right to speech and that the
prohibition of “electioneering communications” by the BCRA overburdens corpo-
rations’ exercise of this right. Therefore, the Court ruled that corporations could
14
spend an unlimited amount of money from their general treasuries to finance express
advocacy ads to support or oppose a candidate, as long as such spending was not
coordinated with a candidate. Before the BCRA, corporations were allowed to make
independent political expenditures as long as they did not expressly advocate for
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. The test for express advocacy
was whether the ad both clearly identifies a candidate and uses some magic words
such as “vote for” or “vote against.” However, corporations prior to 2002 had been
able to circumvent this restriction by using shame ads, which the BCRA attempted
to prohibit.5 Therefore, the Citizens United decision stuck down not only the BCRA
provisions on “electioneering communications,” but also portion of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act that restricted independent expenditures by corporations. The
decision also reversed a large body of case law. By stipulating that corporations,
for profit or not, have a First Amendment right to free speech, Citizens United
represented a dramatic doctrinal shift on campaign finance regulation.
Citizens United did not change limits on direct campaign contributions, soft
money bans, or disclaimers and disclosure requirements on independent expenditure.
However, following the reasoning of the decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission
(2010) that individuals and corporations can donate an unlimited amount of money
to political action committees that solely exist to make independent expenditures.
This decision gave rise to independent-expenditure-only PACs, commonly known
5As delineated in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (1986), a small, restricted class of
not-for-profit, political organizations were exempted from the prohibition of making express advo-
cacy. Other entities, including not-for-profit organizations established by a business corporation,
remained banned from making express advocacy ads under the Federal Election Campaign Act.
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as Super PACs, which emerged in the 2010 midterm elections and were even more
prominent in the 2012 presidential election. Super PACs, which are often aligned
with specific candidates and managed by former campaign staff of the candidates,
are likely to render contribution limits ineffective and disclosure requirements in-
adequate. The Citizens United group itself is registered as a tax-exempt nonprofit
501(c)4 organization under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, a type of organization
whose primary purpose is promotion of social welfare but that is allowed to engage
in political activities. 501(c)4 organizations differ from 527 organizations, which are
political organizations such as PACs, candidate committees, and party committees,
in that 501(c)4 organizations only have disclosure obligations for independent expen-
ditures but not for detailed sources of donations received. Therefore, the stand-by
disclaimers by a campaign ad’s sponsor may not adequately reveal information about
an ad’s financiers. Following Citizens United, there has been a spike in indepen-
dent expenditures, as shown in Figure 1.2. In 2012, the first presidential election
cycle following Citizens United, independent expenditures by outside groups had a
more than six-fold increase from the previous presidential election, which had two
competitive primaries rather than one in 2012.
1.2.5 Were Judicial Events Likely to Reveal News?
Events surrounding Supreme Court cases on campaign finance regulation will
only have substantial impact on firm valuations if the events reveal news to the
market. In other words, these events must not have been forecastable. Campaign
16
Figure 1.2: Total Independent Expenditures by Election Cycle
Independent expenditures by outside groups, excluding party committees;
Source: Center for Responsive Politics.
finance has been a controversial area of constitutional law. Cases are often decided
by close votes and sometimes no set of views commands an agreement within the
voting majority (Briffault, 2008). McConnell, WRTL II, and Citizens United were
all 5-4 decisions. There was considerable uncertainty about the outcomes of the
cases, which make them suitable for an event study.
Table 1.1 shows which justices were in the majority and minority in the three
cases. In McConnell, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was considered the swing vote.
Her retirement in 2006 shifted the balance of the Court on WRTL II and Citizens
United. However, Justice O’Connor was in the minority in Austin, in which the
majority ruled that forbidding corporations from using their treasury money for
17
independent expenditures to support or oppose a candidate did not violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, which was one of the critical precedents that
the counsels of the FEC relied on to defend the BCRA in McConnell, WRTL II,
and Citizens United. Austin was overruled in Citizens United.
In WRTL II, there were two new Court members since McConnell: Chief
Justice John Roberts, who clerked for and succeeded Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Samuel Alito, who succeeded Justice O’Connor. Though both were nom-
inated by President George W. Bush and were generally considered conservative,
it was unclear how they would vote in WRTL II. Justice Alito did not ask many
questions during the oral argument of WRTL II to reveal his opinion.
In Citizens United, there was another new member of the court, as Justice
Sonia Sotomayor had succeeded Justice David Souter, who was in the majority of
McConnell but in the minority in WRTL II. In fact, the re-argument of Citizens
United was the first case heard by Justice Sotomayor on the Court’s bench. Another
dimension of uncertainty was the extent to which Chief Justice Roberts, as well as
Justice Alito, were willing to narrow or reverse McConnell. This uncertainty per-
tained to both WRTL II and Citizens United. In WRTL, Justices Thomas, Scalia,
and Kennedy did not sign on Parts III and IV of the opinion authored by the Chief
Justice, as they preferred to overturn McConnell on “electioneering communica-
tions” outright. In Citizens United, the Chief Justice devoted a substantial part
of the opinion to address the issue of stare decisis, the legal principle of respecting
precedents.
The decision of WRTL I was per curiam. That is, it was designated as a
18
collective and anonymous decision of the Court. Per curiam decisions are typically
brief and based on narrow grounds, as was the case for WRTL I, which vacated the
decision made by the lower court and remanded it for reconsideration.
Oral arguments can reveal information that might be capitalized into stock
prices. How the oral argument proceeds is indicative to how the Justices will later
vote. Justices tend to vote against the party toward whom more of their questions
are directed (Epstein et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 2009). Their tone and the way
they ask questions also matter (Shullman, 2004). Questions asked by the Justices
also convey their concerns, which not only hint at which party the Justices intend
to vote with, but also suggest whether they intend to decide the case on a broad or
narrow ground. Moreover, for new members of the Court, their questions may also be
informative of their legal approaches in the particular subject matter of the case, and
more generally about their jurisprudence. For example, Epstein et al. (2009) find
that Justices differ in their tendency to reverse rulings by lower courts. Iaryczower
and Shum (2012) find not only that Justices differ in their ideological predisposition,
but that their responsiveness to case-specific information varies as well. Lastly, how
well a counsel is able to clarify his or her position and address the concerns of
the Justices may sometimes change how a Justice votes (Johnson et al., 2009). In
light of information revealed during oral arguments, financial markets could adjust
their expectations about the outcomes of the cases, and more importantly about
the application of campaign finance laws.
Having a case accepted by the Supreme Court is a crucial first step towards a
successful appeal at the high court. Only about 1% of cases filed with the Supreme
19
Court are granted review, so the mere fact that a case is granted review is itself news-
worthy. Expectations on the outcomes and implications of a case may be formed at
this point. Moreover, as granting review only requires four votes from the Justices,
a Justice with a strong opinion or agenda in an area may strategically select cases to
be heard, depending on his or her estimate of the likelihood of securing a fifth vote
to decide a case in line with his or her judgment (Toobin, 2007; Stern and Wermiel,
2010). In controversial and divisive areas such as campaign finance law, strategic
considerations may be particularly relevant in granting review. For the above rea-
sons, both the decision to grant review and oral arguments are studied as events
potentially affecting share prices. However, results are qualitatively unchanged if














































































































































































































































































































































































































1.3 Data and Methodology
Data on campaign contributions made by PACs affiliated with business corpo-
rations are obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics, which complies data
from various sources including the FEC and the Senate Office of Public Records.
Corporations whose affiliated PACs contributed in all three election cycles to con-
gressional candidates between 2003 and 2008 are included in the sample of politically
active firms. These firms are matched with daily stock price and return data from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) by their names. The BCRA
became effective on November 6, 2002, one day after the 2002 election. The main
data consists of the stock returns of 553 matched firms from November 6, 2002 to
December 31, 2011. Earlier stock return data are also used in calculating abnormal
returns. In the benchmark specification, I use a Fama-French (1992, 1993) three-
factor model to calculate abnormal returns. These factors are downloaded from
Kenneth French’s website. When analyzing heterogeneous reactions in stock prices,
I also use financial data of firms taken from COMPUSTAT, and employment data
by state and industry from the U.S. Census Bureau, Local Employment Dynamics.
The contributing firms are relatively large. The median contributing firm
had a market capitalization of $5.1 billion on Dec 30, 2011, as compared to $11.2
billion for a median S&P 500 firm. On average, sample firms account for 12%
of listed U.S. firms in the CRSP dataset and for 61% of market capitalization.
Figure 1.3 plots the kernel densities of log market capitalization as of Dec. 30, 2011
for both contributing firms and non-contributing CRSP firms. The median amount
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of campaign contributions is $188,000 over the three election cycles. Sample firms
span over 312 4-digit SIC industries and 192 3-digit industries. The majority of
these firms also reported lobbying expenditures in 2008 and 2009 according to data
taken from the Center for Responsive Politics, which compiles data on lobbying
expenditures from the Senate Office of Public Records. Table 1.2 reports summary
statistics of the data sample of contributing firms as well as the broader universe of
CRSP observations.
Figure 1.3: Kernel Density of Log Market Capitalization of Contributing and Non-
contributing Firms
In the baseline specification, I estimate the following model:







Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Sample period Nov. 6, 2002 - Dec. 31, 2011
All CRSP firms:
Number of trading days 2305
Market capitalization of median S&P 500 firm∗ $11.2 billion
Market capitalization of all firms $ 13.4 trillion
Average number of trading firms 4471
Total number of firms 9303
Contributed to all three election cycles
from 2003 to 2008:
Number of firms 553
Number of observations 1132742
Median market capitalization∗ $ 5.12 billion
Total market capitalization† $ 8.16 trillion
Lobbied in 2008 and 2009 70%
Median campaign contributions from 2003 to 2008 $ 187,500
Contributed to all six election cycles
from 1997 to 2008:
Number of firms 389
Number of observations 818052
Median market capitalization∗ $ 6.69 billion
Total market capitalization† $ 7.09 trillion
Lobbied in 2008 and 2009 73%
Median campaign contributions from 2003 to 2008 $ 280,500
∗ As of Dec. 30, 2011
† Average across sample period
where Rit is the abnormal return for the stock of firm i on day t, and De,τ,t is a
dummy variable which takes on a value of one if day t is the τ th day following
event e and zero otherwise (negative τ means |τ | days before event e). There are
14 events associated with the four Supreme Court cases. To allow for possible
information leaks and time for the market to digest the news, I look at 5 days
before and 5 days after the event days. Thus, each event is associated with 11
24
dummy variables. However, as shown in the following section, the market seems
to be quick to incorporate relevant news into stock prices, and there is only weak
evidence that information is leaked before event days. For conservative estimates of
stock price reactions to campaign finance deregulation, I focus on event windows no
more than 3 days in length in subsequent analysis.
In order to the calculate abnormal return Rit, I first estimate the following
rolling Fama-French three-factor model for each day and each firm:
rit − rft = αi + γi(rmt − r
f
t ) + δiSMBt + λiHMLt + εit
where rit is the buy-and-hold stock return for firm i on day t; r
f
t is the risk-free
return, equal to the one-day return on a 90-day treasury bill; rmt is the return
of a market portfolio; SMBt, small-minus-big, is the return on a portfolio of a
small capitalization firms minus that on a portfolio of large capitalization firms; and
HMLt, high-minus-low, is the portfolio return of high book-to-market equity firms
minus that of low book-to-market ones. Firm i’s normal return on day t, denoted
by r̂it, is the out-of-sample predicted return based on the estimated model for firm
i using its stock returns from the one year immediately prior to that day, excluding









t ) + δ̂iSMBt + λ̂iHMLt
]
where α̂i, γ̂i, δ̂i and λ̂i are estimated using the most recent year of data for firm
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i before day t. The abnormal return Rit is the actual return minus the predicted
normal return:
Rit = rit − r̂it
As my sample period spans almost a decade, using a rolling asset pricing model
allows the firm-specific factor loading coefficients γi, δi and λi to change continuously
over time. The two-step estimation approach adopted here has the advantage of
being more flexible, as compared to a one-step strategy regressing stock returns on
factors and dummy variables indicating the occurrence of events at the same time.
Standard errors are calculated allowing shocks εit to be correlated within days across
firms, and within 3-digit SIC industries across days (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Main Results
Estimated coefficients of day dummies are combined to give mean cumulative
abnormal returns across days and events. Table 1.3 reports the cumulative abnormal
returns on the event days and over two or three day event windows for each case as
well as for three cases combined. For McConnell, over the 3 days of granting review,
oral arguments, and the decision announcement, politically active firms on average
have a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -0.27%, significant at the 10% level.
The stock values of politically active firms are expected to react negatively to the
McConnell events, as the decision upheld campaign finance regulations. Over the
26
6 event days marking the development of WRTL cases, politically active firms on
average have a CAR of 0.41%, significant at the 5% level. Over the 5 event days
marking the development of Citizens United, the average CAR is 1.01%, significant
at the 1% level. I find similar patterns, with larger magnitudes, if I broaden the
event window to the 3 days centered around each event. Combining three cases,
with estimates for McConnell entering with the opposite sign as that decision upheld
campaign finance restrictions, the mean CAR is 1.68% over the 14 event days and
2.21% over the 14 three-day event windows. These results suggest that relaxing
legal constraints on political spending by corporations subsequently increases the


































































































































































































































































































































































































The left two columns in Table 1.4 report the mean abnormal return over the 14
sample events (again with McConnell entering with an opposite sign) for each day
in an eleven-day window centered around the event days. Let Day 0 be the event
day. Only Day 0 and Day 2 have statistically significant abnormal returns across
events at the 5% level. Day 0 has a positive average abnormal return of 1.69%, while
Day 2 has a negative average abnormal return of -1.24%. The negative returns on
Day 2 would invalidate our previous conclusions if we believe that investors takes
2 days to digest the event information and realize that deregulation in campaign
finance is bad for business. However, this is not the case. The mean CAR from
Day 0 through Day 2 after the four Court decisions is 0.95%, significant at 2% level.
As reported in the bottom rows of middle two columns, the CAR across 14 events
starting from Day 0 is always positive. Reported in the right two columns, CARs
measured on an 11-day event window centered around Day 0 are large and positive
at 1.93%, albeit imprecisely estimated. The abnormality on Day 2 is likely due to
confounding factors, such as industry-wise shocks. In fact, the negative CAR on
Day 2 is not robust to alternative measures of abnormal returns as detailed in the
next section.
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Table 1.4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%) around Key Supreme Court Devel-
opments of the Three Litigations















-5 0.135 [−5, 0] 3.022*** - -
(0.580) (0.817)
-4 0.685 [−4, 0] 2.883*** - -
(0.489) (0.725)
-3 0.221 [−3, 0] 2.286*** - -
(0.478) (0.825)
-2 0.130 [−2, 0] 2.066*** - -
(0.477) (0.497)
-1 0.247 [−1, 0] 1.936*** - -
(0.403) (0.415)
0 1.689*** [0, 0] 1.689*** [0, 0] 1.689***
(0.292) (0.292) (0.292)
+1 0.270 [0,+1] 1.959*** [−1,+1] 2.206***
(0.404) (0.463) (0.581)
+2 -1.240*** [0,+2] 0.719 [−2,+2] 1.405
(0.460) (0.779) (0.965)
+3 -0.098 [0,+3] 0.621 [−3,+3] 1.138
(0.401) (0.738) (1.310)
+4 -0.563 [0,+4] 0.208 [−4,+4] 1.322
(0.789) (0.730) (0.853)
+5 0.817* [0,+5] 0.676 [−5,+5] 1.929
(0.474) (0.896) (1.183)
Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered two-way, by day and by 3-digit SIC.
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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The market seems to be quick in reacting to new information. From the left
column of Table 1.4, the average abnormal return on Day 1 is positive but modest
and insignificant. The CARs over windows ending on the event day are all positive
and significant, while the CARs over windows starting on the event day become
imprecise after Day 1. The mean abnormal returns for each individual day from
Day -5 to Day -1 are all positive. However, these returns are not significant, whether
individually or combined. Hence, there is at best limited evidence of systematical
information leaks before the event day. However, this may not be the case for the
decision announcement of Citizens United. On January 20, 2010, at the end of
the Wednesday regular morning sections of oral argument, the Court announced
that there was going to be a special section starting at 10AM the next day to
issue one or more decisions of cases previously heard. Longtime Supreme Court
reporter Lyle Denniston, as well as reporters from The Washington Post and The
New York Times, blogged about this unusual move on that day. As it had been more
than one and a half year since Citizens United was initially filed with the Supreme
Court, observers expected the special section to include the long-awaited decision
of Citizens United. Moreover, there was speculation that the decision was going to
be controversial. This speculation was, of cause, correct. Justice Stevens, 89 years
old, labored for an usually long 20 minutes to announce his dissent. Figure 1.4
shows that on the decision day, the volume of Google searches for “Citizens United”
jumped from virtually zero to four times as high as average daily search volume
in January 2010, then peaked at one day after the announcement of the decision.
The sudden hike of search volume suggests that the public did not anticipate the
31
decision of Citizens United.
Citizens United was a very unpopular decision. An ABC News/The Washing-
ton Post poll conducted in early February 2010 found that 80 percent of respon-
dents opposed the Court’s decision, including 65% who strongly opposed it. Citizens
United was the only decision announced that day. The Wall Street Journal reported
the decision of Citizens United at the top of its front page. The average abnormal
return for politically active firms on this day was 0.39%, significant at the 5% level.
Figure 1.4: Search and News Reference Volume of Citizens United
Table 1.5 reports the CARs by type of event. As mentioned, stock returns
around both review granting and (initial) oral arguments react in the same way
as they do around the decisions. Ordering re-argument and the proceeding of re-
32
argument are associated with negative CARs. In retrospect, the re-argument order
has been seen as an invitation by the Court majority to challenge the facial validity
of the BCRA. But ex ante, it was arguably unclear whether it was possible for the
Court to overrule McConnell and Austin. However, this discussion may be moot, as
the negative CRA associated with re-argument events is not robust to alternative
measures of abnormal returns considered in the next section. The combined CARs






































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.5: Combined Cumulative Abnormal Returns: By Day
Figure 1.6: Combined Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Event Windows from Day -5
Notes: Dash lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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1.4.2 Alternative Measures of Stock Returns and Sub-sample of Firms
This section provides results using alternative ways of measuring abnormal
returns. First, I start with a simple measure of abnormal returns, namely returns in
excess of the return of a market portfolio. Second, I augment a Fama-French three-
factor model with an extra factor, the return of an industry portfolio. The industry
portfolio is a value weighted portfolio of firms that never contributed in the three
election cycles from 2003 to 2008, within the same 3-digit Standard Industry Classifi-
cation (SIC) of a contributing firm. This measure controls for industry-wide shocks,
which may confound our baseline results. Third, I measure the abnormal return as
the firm’s raw return minus the return of the industry portfolio constructed above.
Finally, I measure the abnormal return as the raw return of the contributing firm
in excess of a matched non-contributing firm. The matching firm is selected from a
set of firms which (i) never contributed in the six election cycles from 1997 to 2008;
and (ii) fall within the same 3-digit SIC industry of the contributing firm. Following
Dube et al. (2011), contributing firm i is matched to the non-contributing firm m





(di − dm)′V −1(di − dm)
}
where di and dm are vectors of measures for firm i and firm m respectively. The
vector d includes the mean and standard deviation of daily returns, average daily
market capitalization, and factor loading betas from a Fama-French three-factor
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model.6 V is the diagonal matrix of the variance-covariance matrix of the above
estimated measures in the corresponding (monthly) matching period.
Drazen et al. (2007) argue that a moderate contribution cap may improve
the bargaining position of special interest groups vis-à-vis politicians. The resulting
higher rents, in turn, induce entry to the lobbying process. They find evidence of cap-
induced entry of PACs at the state level. To minimize the potentially confounding
effect of endogenous entry, I re-do the previous analysis using a subsample of firms
that also contributed in all three of the election cycles before the BCRA came into
effect.
Table 1.6 reports results from the above robustness tests. The upper panel
uses the baseline sample of firms contributing to all three election cycles from 2003
to 2008. The lower panel uses a sample of firms contributing to all six election cycles
from 1997 to 2008. As compared to baseline results (reported in the first column in
the upper panel), results using alternative measures of abnormal returns and/or the
sub-sample of firms are qualitatively unchanged. For the larger sample, the average
cumulative return in excess of market returns over the 14 event days is negative but
imprecisely estimated. However, the average cumulative return in excess of market
returns over a three-day window is positive and significant at 3.8%, larger than
the baseline result. The negative estimated average cumulative return in excess
of market on event days is due to two events, granting review and oral arguments
of Citizens United. Both of these events took place during a period of elevated
6Estimates of factor loading coefficients are updated monthly for each firm, again estimated
using data within one calendar year immediate before, excluding any event window studied here;
Mean and standard deviation of daily returns, and average daily market capitalization are also
updated monthly.
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financial turbulence due to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. In the 6 months starting
from October 1st, 2008, the stock market lost more than one third of its value. On
these 2 event days, the S&P 500 index fell by 2% and 4% respectively. This makes
it particularly important to control in a flexible way for the risk factors contributing
to stock movements. Taking out these two events, the average cumulative return in
excess of market returns is positive. This is because the return in excess of market
return, rit− rmt, effectively imposes a β of one across all firms, while other columns
allow for β to vary by firm and over time. Other specifications allowing for flexible
control of risk factors report positive and significant abnormal returns for politically
active firms. Moreover, controlling for industry returns, as reported in the last three
columns of Table 1.6, slightly attenuate the cumulative abnormal returns. However,
these CARs mostly remain statistically significant. Results are similarly robust for






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.4.3 Uniform Rank Test
Given that the number of events is small, a test based on large sample asymp-
totics may have a distorted test size due to the non-normality of the distribution of
stock returns. Dube et al. (2011) propose a nonparametric small sample exact test
that does not depend on asymptotic normality. The test, called the uniform rank
test, utilizes the fact that the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random
variable follows a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. The sum of M independently,
identically, and uniformly distributed random variables with support [0, 1], denoted









This provides a basis for a finite sample test free of distributional assumptions. To
implement the test, I calculate the average daily abnormal return across the con-
tributing firms over the sample period from November 6, 2002 to December 30,
2011. The average abnormal return for each event day is ranked against the aver-
age abnormal returns of other days outside of any 11-day event window to obtain a
quantile statistic. The quantile statistic should be fairly precisely estimated because
(i) for each day the number of contributing firms is large; (ii) there are 2158 days
of abnormal returns for contributing firms outside of any event windows; and (iii)
order statistics converge fast. Quantiles for each event, with those associated with
McConnell replaced with their distance from one, are summed to generate a test
40
statistic. Under the null hypothesis that abnormal returns have the same distribu-
tion on event and non-event days, this test statistic would be close to 7, the average
sum of 14 uniformly distributed random variables over the unit interval. If the test
statistic is sufficiently high, based on the one-tail p-value calculated according to
Eq. (1), one can conclude that campaign finance deregulation is associated with
significantly higher stock values. I construct similar quantiles and test statistics for
average CARs over 2- and 3-day event windows. Table 1.7 reports the combined
mean CARs of the 14 events using various measures of abnormal returns as well
as the associated p-values from the uniform rank test, for both the full sample and
the subsample of firms contributing in all six election cycles. Because the point
estimates of CARs in Table 1.7 are simple averages of various measures CARs over
the event windows, they slightly differ from those reported in Table 1.6, which are
obtained from adding up estimated coefficients of dummy variables indicating event
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.4.4 Outliers and Heterogeneity
Results from simple averages of cumulative abnormal returns and associated
nonparametric tests, as reported in Table 1.7, suggest that the main results are
unlikely to be driven by outliers. However, if the main results are driven by a small
set of firms benefiting extraordinarily from the deregulation of campaign finance, our
baseline results are susceptible to an overly broad interpretation. To address this
concern, I carry out various methods limiting the influence of stocks with extreme
movements. First, I apply the least absolute deviation (LAD) method, which is
robust to outliers. If the effects of multiple events on a median firm’s stock value
are additive, LAD estimates can also be interpreted as the combined effect on the
median firm’s stock value. Second, stocks whose prices are volatile over time are
down weighted in least squares estimates. I apply the Weighted Least Square (WLS)
method where weights are inversely proportional to the firm’s standard deviation of
abnormal returns throug out the sample period. Third, stock returns that fall in
either tail of the daily returns distribution are trimmed. As reported in Table 1.8,
estimates using these alternative methods continue to yield positive and significant












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While my main results do not appear to be driven by outlier firms, it is likely
that some firms will benefit more from loosened campaign finance law than others.
In the remainder of this section, I explore two possible sources of heterogeneity.
The first characteristic relates to the growth prospects of a firm. Sunset in-
dustries are known to be more successful than others in tilting policy in their favor
(Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007). Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007) argue that, for sunset industries, rents generated by lobbying
are not eroded by new firms. Firms in sunset industries incurred a sunk fixed invest-
ment in the past. While their assets may be costly to replace, they are expected to
generate limited cash flows in the future. For these industries, the fair value of assets
calculated from discounted expected cash flows is low relative to their replacement
cost. As long as rents from lobbying are not too high, they induce no entry and
incumbents can therefore enjoy all the rents. This is not true for growing industries.
In these industries, capital stocks are expanding, adjustments to capital stocks are
frequent, and the replacement value of assets should be close to fair value. Higher
rents could induce new firm entry, which in turn would dissipate rents.
Consistent with this argument, I find that firms with low profit margins, low
net capital expenditures, and high book-to-market ratios of equity have higher ab-
normal returns on event days loosening campaign finance laws. I pool the abnormal
returns over the 14 event days and regress them over proxies of growth prospects (or
lack thereof). Event dummy variables are also included in the regression.Table 1.9
reports the univariate and multivariate regression results. Profit margin is defined
as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided
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by total revenue in the latest fiscal year. Net capital expenditure is the capital ex-
penditure net of depreciation, normalized by total revenue in the latest fiscal year.
The book-to-market ratio of assets measures the replacement value of total assets
related to the market value of a firm (to creditors and equity holders). A higher
value for this measure indicates that lower growth prospects are priced into a firm’s
value. Notice that a negative relationship between growth prospects and abnormal
returns on event days is not likely due to risk factors common to all low growth
firms, as I accounted for such factors in the Fama-French three-factor model used
to calculate abnormal returns.7
7In the baseline Fama-French three-factor model used in this paper, one risk factor is book-to-
market equity. Regression using book-to-market equity instead of book-to-market assets provides



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Abnormal return on event days are also correlated with the concentration of an
industry’s employment across states. Conditional on overall employment, industries
whose employment is concentrated in a few states are likely to have more influence on
legislators, even without resorting to campaign contributions or auxiliary electoral
spending. Re-election concerns alone would motivate congressional delegates from
states with a large number of voters employed by a particular industry to promote
bills in favor of the industry and block bills detrimental to the industry. Cohen et
al. (2012) find that senators’ votes on bills pertaining to large industries in their
states predict subsequent stock performance of these industries, which suggests that
senators possess superior information regarding the impact of bills on industries in
their states and vote in line with the interest of such industries. Whether lobbying is
considered as information transmission as in Grossman and Helpman (2001), or as
subsidizing legislative effort to friendly legislators as in Hall and Deardorff (2006), it
seems likely that industries whose employments is concentrated in just a few states
are better positioned to lobby than industries where employment is geographically
dispersed.
To the extent that money could partially make up for an industry’s lack of
effective representation in Congress, loosening campaign finance regulation could be
especially beneficial to industries with employment scattered across states (Bombar-
dini and Trebbi, 2011). To measure the geographical concentration of an industry’s
employment, I construct three variables as follows. Let eij be employment of indus-


























log(1 + #Top5) = log(1 + Number of States in which industry i is a top 5 employer)
The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared state shares of an industry’s employment.
The concentration index is the sum of squared deviations of an industry employment
fraction in a state from its employment fraction nationally. The last measure is a log
transformation of the number of states in which a firm’s industry is a top 5 employer.
Since the an industry’s national employment is controlled for in the regression, this
measures capture the concentration of an industry’s employment.
As reported in Table1.10, geographic concentration of employment tends to
reduce the abnormal returns resulting from campaign finance deregulation. A one
standard deviation increase in either of the two concentration indices lowers the
abnormal returns by about 0.06 percentage point on each event day, implying an
overall decline in the CAR across 14 events of 0.8 percentage point, which is substan-
tial when compared to the average baseline CAR (1.689 percentage points).8 The
number of states in which an industry is a top 5 employer also is negatively related
to abnormal returns around event days, though with weaker statistical power and a
smaller effect.
8Again, abnormal returns on event days related to McConnell enter in opposite sign.
49
Table 1.10: Industrial Employment Concentration Across States and Abnormal Re-
turns
Dependent Variable: Daily FF-3 Abnormal Returns of Contributing Firms






log(1 + #Top5) -0.012*
(0.007)
Industry’s Share of -3.431* -1.941 5.843
National Employment (2.071) (2.054) (4.536)
# Obs. 5718 5718 5718
S.E. method Cluster by firm Cluster by firm Cluster by firm
F.E. Event Event Event
The specification is: ARit = α+ βCit + δt + εit, where ARit is the abnormal return of firm i in event t;
δt is a event fixed effect; and Cit is one of the employment concentration measures defined below:























log(1 + #Top5) = log(1 + No. of States in which industry i is top 5 industry by employment)
Constants are included but not reported.
Industries are at 3-digit of NACIS. Dependent variable is measured in percentage point.
One standard deviation of Herfindahl and Concentration index are 0.064 and 0.074 respectively.
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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1.4.5 Do Campaign Finance Decision Affect the Overall Market?
One rationale for campaign finance regulation is to restrict unfair influence
by big corporations with a vast amount of money. Without restrictions on political
spending, large corporations, individually and as a group, may exercise undue influ-
ence on the electoral process to obtain policies biased toward them. On the other
hand, the benefits of a pro-big-business policy environment may not be limited to
politically active firms as defined here.
There is some support in the data for the idea that some politically inactive
firms may benefit from loosening campaign finance restrictions. On days with de-
velopments leading to campaign finance deregulation, firms with small market cap-
italization perform poorly relative to firms with large market capitalization. The
upper panel of Table 1.11 reports cumulative returns of the small-minus-big (SMB)
Fama-French factor over the 14 case events, again with McConnell returns entering
with an opposite sign. The Fama-French SMB factor, which is the return differential
between value-weighted portfolios of firms below and above median market capital-
ization, has a cumulative return of -4.12% over the 14 event days, with a p-value
of 0.071 from a uniform rank test analogous to previous one. However, this result









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































With campaign finance deregulation, firms whose prices suggest lower growth
prospects (i.e. value firms), also perform well relative to growth firms. The high-
minus-low (HML) Fama-French factor is defined as the return differential between
value weighted portfolios of firms with top third and bottom third book-to-market
equity ratio. The HML over the 14 event days is 1.48%, with a p-value of 0.059
from a uniform rank test. This is consistent with previous evidence that firms in
sunset industries benefit more from loosened campaign finance regulation. These
results suggest that on top of any aggregate impact of the loosened campaign fi-
nance regulations, contributing firms with low growth prospects gain more. Finally,
Table 1.11 also reports the cumulative overall market return across events. There
is no evidence that campaign finance deregulation is associated with higher stock
values for all listed firms in the United States.
The above relationships are confirmed by estimates from the following model
rqt − rft = αi + βq(rmt − r
f
t ) + γ(Dt × q) + εqt
where q = 1, 2, · · · , 5 indicate valued-weighted portfolios formed by sorting firms
into quintiles by market capitalization or book-to-market equity ratio, with q = 1
being the portfolio of smallest firms by market capitalization or firms with the lowest
book-to-market ratio and q = 5 being the portfolio of the largest firms or firms with
the highest book-to-market ratio; rit is the raw return of portfolio i on day t; r
f
t
is the risk-free 90-day treasury bill return on day t; rmt is the market return; and
Dt is a variable indicating whether day t is in an event window associated with
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relaxing campaign finance restrictions (Dt = 1), maintaining restrictions (Dt = −1)
or otherwise (Dt = 0).
Using data from Kenneth French’s website, in which constituent firms of var-
ious portfolios are updated regularly, the lower panel of Table 1.11 reports the esti-
mates of γ for various event windows. Focusing on a one-day event window, which
should be less noisy, smaller and high-growth firms have lower returns in reaction
to campaign finance deregulation. Firms in one lower (smaller) quintile on average
have 0.093% lower returns on days with campaign finance deregulation. The four-
teen events together imply a cumulative return that is lower by 1.30%. Similarly,
the fourteen events together imply that firms with the lowest book-to-market equity
ratio, i.e. firms priced with the highest growth prospects, have a cumulative return
3.36 percentage points lower than firms priced with the lowest growth prospects.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I document that the stock value of firms with a history of con-
tributing to congressional candidates reacts positively to court-ordered deregulations
of political spending.
In McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court upheld most provisions in the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which regulated soft money contributions
and independent expenditures on issue ads for electoral advocacy. Around the days
when the Supreme Court granted review, heard oral arguments, and announced the
decision the stock value of these firms decreased by 0.27% on average. In FEC v.
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Wisconsin Right to Life and Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court weakened
and struck down provisions on independent expenditures. Around the key develop-
ments of the two cases, contributing firms experienced a 1.5% increase in their stock
value on average. These results suggest that firms benefit from their engagements
in the electoral processes, and that politically active firms benefit from loosening
constraints on their political spending. Campaign finance regulations are, to some
extent, able to limit the influence of interest groups through political spending.
Moreover, the stock market as a whole did not react positively to these deregu-
lations. Firms with dimmer growth prospects benefited more from the deregulation
of political spending. This is consistent with the argument that sunset industries are
more successful in lobbying because lobbied rents would not be dissipated by entry of
new firms. Overall, I find no evidence supporting the argument that, by fostering a
competitive marketplace of ideas, deregulation of political spending by corporations
improves political processes toward more economically efficient policies.
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Chapter 2: National Representation and Local Public Expenditure:
A Natural Experiment from Japan
2.1 Introduction
Does the number of political representatives affect the allocation of public
resources? In a representative democracy, the primary means for citizens to affect
policies is through their representatives. Therefore, the number of representatives
is often considered a proxy of political power possessed by a group of citizens. For
example, each state has two senators in the U.S. Senate, regardless of population.
Small states therefore have greater representation in the Senate in per-capita terms.
Altas et al. (1995) and Lee (1998) find that per-capita federal spending is larger
in smaller states. However, it is unclear whether the positive relationship between
the number of representatives per capita and public spending is causal. And if
so, what is the causal mechanism? In particular, since politicians are motivated or
constrained by elections, what role do electoral incentives have in translating greater
political representation into more public spending?
In this paper, I extend the conventional regression discontinuity estimator
applied to vote shares to estimate the effect of having an additional representative
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on local public expenditure in Japan. In Japan’s mixed-member electoral system,
a candidate who fails to obtain a plurality of votes in a single-winner district may
still be elected through a party list, effectively giving her district two representatives
instead of one. I find that having an additional representative on average increases
total municipal expenditure by 1.8% and discretionary spending on public works by
7.7%. The higher expenditures are attributable to more transfers from the central
government.
Moreover, within districts that are gaining representation, municipalities with
a large share of supporters for the additional representative gain, but so do mu-
nicipalities with strong support for the first representative. Because the second
representative is likely to compete with the first representative in the following elec-
tion, the presence of an extra representative weakens the incumbency advantage
of the first representative, intensifying electoral competition. This result suggests
that political competition incentivizes politicians to bring public spending to core
supporters in their districts. I provide some evidence that strongholds for either the
first representative or the additional representative have higher voter turnout rates
in the following election. This is consistent with politicians delivering electorally
motivated spending in order to turn out their core supporters to vote in future
elections.
The main results described above are obtained from a quasi-randomized sam-
ple I construct by extending the conventional regression discontinuity design. I
exploit two sources of discontinuity in Japan’s electoral system. A candidate who
loses in a district may still be elected if her ranking on the party list is high enough.
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Her ranking on the party list depends on her performance in the district race rela-
tive to the winner in her district race. A small change in the vote share of either
the losing candidate or the winning candidate may alter the ranking of the losing
candidate on the party list. This is the first source of discontinuity that I exploit.
The second discontinuity that I exploit comes from the ripple effects of the
outcomes of close elections. A candidate who narrowly loses in a close election is
likely to have a high ranking on her party list. If due to a small electoral shock the
candidate instead wins in the close election, she vacates her position on the party
list, allowing another candidate on the same party list to be elected. A close election
in one district may therefore create a ripple effect on whether other districts have
an additional representative.
In a conventional regression discontinuity design, two candidates compete for
office. Whichever candidate obtains more than 50% of the votes wins. The identifi-
cation assumption is that in elections where candidates’ vote shares are sufficiently
close to the 50% threshold, the assignments of winners are as if random because
a small random shock could alter them. I generalize this idea by perturbing the
observed vote shares slightly to generate a counterfactual allocation of extra rep-
resentatives to districts. Essentially, I construct a quasi-randomized sample, which
consists of districts that may marginally gain or lose an additional representative
when subjected to small perturbations to observed vote shares. In this sample,
whether a district has an additional representative is as if random.
The natural experiment I analyze in this paper relates to three strands of
literature on political representation, electoral competition and distribution of public
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spending. First, it relates to the literature that examines the empirical relationship
between the number of representatives per capita and public spending. In Altas et
al. (1995) and Lee (1998), since the number of seats for an electoral district is fixed,
cross-sectional variation in the number of representatives per capita is driven by
variation in population. But population potentially correlates with a large number
of other factors affecting public expenditure, creating difficulties for causal inference.
Ansolabehere et al. (2002) adopt a novel difference-in-difference (DID) strategy,
using an arguably exogenous Supreme Court decision mandating the one-person-
one-vote principle in the apportionment of state legislatures to eliminate potentially
confounding time-invariant heterogeneity. However, a mandated equalization of
apportionment may change the power structure in the state legislature. For example,
previously underrepresented urban interests may gain seats in the state legislature at
the expense of rural interests. In this case, transfers to a local area may change even
if its representation as measured by the seat-to-population ratio remains unchanged.
In other words, the DID assumption of parallel trends may be violated.
Similar limitations also apply to the DID strategy adopted by Horiuchi and
Saito (2003). They use changes in seat-to-population ratio due to the 1994 electoral
reform in Japan. In this case, not only was the entire electoral system overhauled,
but campaign finance regulations were also reformed to favor parties over individual
politicians. For example, public subsidies to parties for campaigns and general
administration were introduced, and corporate and labor union contributions to
individual politicians were banned. Both the power structure of the legislature and
the electoral incentives are likely to have changed after the electoral reform.
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In this paper, I examine the effects of having an extra representative on public
spending, holding the population and composition of an electoral district unchanged.
The empirical strategy allows me to hold the power structure in the legislature as
fixed, isolating the effects of effective representation on public spending in local
areas. This paper adds to an emerging empirical literature that uses regression dis-
continuity designs to study political representation and policy outcomes. Albouy
(2013) studies the effects of political representation in the majority party in the
U.S. Congress on federal grants received by states. Pattersson-Lidbom (2008) stud-
ies the effects of majority control by left-wing parties in Swedish local governments
on taxation and government expenditure. Folke (forthcoming) studies the effects
of partisan representation in Swedish local governments on local immigration, envi-
ronmental and tax policies. This paper differs from Pattersson-Lidbom (2008) and
Folke (forthcoming) by studying distributive policies by the national government,
and differs from Albouy (2013) by focusing on the effects of number of representa-
tives on local public expenditure in a parliamentary country.
Second, this paper relates to the literature on political agency problems. In-
cumbency advantage is often considered undesirable because it allows politicians
to be less responsive to voters (Besley and Burgess, 2002). However, in a political
agency model with both moral hazard problems and adverse selection problems,
incumbency advantage naturally arises as voters are to some extent able to select
better politicians through previous elections. The challenge is to empirically dis-
entangle the incentive effects of incumbency advantage from the selection effects of
incumbency advantage. In this paper, the quasi-randomized assignment of an ad-
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ditional representative to a district constitutes a negative shock to the incumbency
advantage of the first representative. When a district is exogenously assigned a
second representative, such a shock has no effect on the selection of the first rep-
resentative. However, the disincentive effect of incumbency advantage for the first
representative is weakened because the first representative is likely to compete with
another incumbent in the following election. This result suggests that electoral com-
petition is of first order importance in translating greater representation into more
public spending.
Third, this paper adds to the literature on electoral rules and public finance.
Electing legislators from small, single-winner districts holds politicians individually
accountable, which may limit corruption (Persson et al., 2003) and help select bet-
ter politicians (Besley, 2007). Legislators elected in large electoral districts that use
party lists and proportional representation rules represent broad interests rather
than narrow, geographically defined interests (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Milesi-
Ferretti et al., 2002). Combining two sets of electoral rules, a mixed-member system
is often thought to have the best of both worlds and has been adopted in more than
a dozen new and existing democracies (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). However,
this paper documents a subtlety in the design of a mixed-member electoral sys-
tem, which makes representatives elected through party lists responsive to narrow,
geographically defined interests. In Japan, the supposedly broad representation
of representatives elected from party lists is compromised by the linkage between
candidates’ ranking on the party lists and their performance in their small home
districts.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides in-
stitutional backgrounds and data description. Section 2.3 describes my empirical
strategy. Section 2.4 presents the main estimates on the effects of political represen-
tation on local public finance. Section 2.5 discusses the role of political affiliation and
legislative bargaining in driving the main results. Section 2.6 discusses how having
an additional representative affects local public expenditure in more heterogeneous
districts. Section 2.7 shows how having an additional representative differentially
affects swing and core municipalities within a district. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background and Data
2.2.1 Local Public Finance in Japan
Compared to the U.S., subnational governments of Japan account for a rela-
tively high share of total public expenditure. Figure 2.1 shows, for both Japan and
the U.S., the shares of non-defense expenditure by the national government, locally
financed expenditures by subnational governments, and expenditures by subnational
governments financed by transfers from the national government.
In Japan, 59% of non-defense public expenditures in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007
were spent by subnational governments, as compared to 52.2% in the U.S. Because
intergovernmental transfers amount to about 10% of total non-defense public ex-
penditure in both Japan and the U.S., this means that the national government
of Japan transfers a larger share of its revenue to subnational governments. How-
ever, subnational governments in Japan have very limited autonomy in generating
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Transfers from the National Government to Subnational Governments
Total Expenditure by the National Government (excl. Transfers & Defense)
Locally Financed Expenditures by Subnational Governments
Fiscal Year 2007
Government Expenditure & Inter−governmental Transfers
Notes: Defense expenditures are excluded for both Japan and the U.S. Total expenditures by
subnational governments are equal to locally financed expenditure plus transfers from the national
government.
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local tax revenue (Weese, 2012). Prefectural and municipal governments rely on
the national government as a major source of revenue.1 From FY 2002 to FY 2010,
total tax revenue of municipal governments on average accounted for 37.2% of to-
tal expenditure by municipal governments. Transfers from the national government
and the prefectural governments accounted for 33.3% and 4.7%, respectively. Other
sources such as debt, user fees and revenue from governmental enterprise made up
the rest. Figure 2.2 shows these shares over the sample period.
























1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Fiscal Year
Local Taxes Transfers fr. Central Gov.
Transfers fr. Prefectural Gov. Borrowing
Average Revenue Sources of Municipal Governments
Because large municipalities are more capable of generating local tax revenue
1As the immediately subnational administrative divisions, prefectural governments are analo-
gous to state governments in the U.S. Prefectures are further divided into a number of municipal-
ities.
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than small municipalities, the median municipality relies even more on transfers from
the national government than those averages would suggest. The median share of
municipal revenue due to transfers from the national government ranges between
40% to 50% from FY 2002 to FY 2010. Figure 2.3 shows the median shares of
municipal revenue from various sources over this period.





























1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Fiscal Year
Local Taxes Transfers fr. Central Gov.
Transfers fr. Prefectural Gov. Borrowing
Median Shares of Municipal Revenue
Transfers from the national government are implemented by a tax sharing
system. Several programs distribute funds to municipal governments, including the
Local Allocation Tax, National Treasury Disbursements and the Local Transfer Tax.
The Local Allocation Tax (LAT) is a formula-based general-purpose grant program
that transfers fixed percentages of revenue of several major national taxes to munici-
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pal governments. To calculate the LAT transfer, national agencies take the difference
between the cost of providing basic public services prescribed by law and the fiscal
capacity of a municipal government. The National Treasury Disbursements provide
mandatory cost sharing of certain public services, the cost of performing respon-
sibilities of the national government entrusted to local governments and support
of specific policies. Finally, the Local Transfer Taxes transfer a fixed proportion of
revenue of several national taxes, mostly excise taxes, to local governments. Though
these programs are more or less formula-based, numerous factors and discretionary
adjustments are considered. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bureaucratic ap-
plication of transfer formulas is not carried out entirely free of political interventions.
For example, politicians in the late the 1990s and early 2000s successfully lobbied
the Ministry of Home Affairs to include access to high-speed rail as a basic public
service, allowing the use of LAT grants to fund bullet train expansion projects in
remote areas (DeWit, 2002).
Given the municipal governments’ fiscal reliance on the national government,
it is reasonable to use total municipal expenditures to measure the effect of political
representation in the national government on local public finance. However, I also
study the effect of political representation on transfers from the national govern-
ments, the gap between total public expenditure and local tax revenue, and more
disaggregate spending measures, although data for these measures are more limited.
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2.2.2 Japan’s Mixed-Member Electoral System
From 1947 to 1993, Japan had an electoral system featuring multi-member
districts (MMD) and a single, non-transferable vote (SNTV). The nation was di-
vided into more than a hundred median-size districts. Each district elected two to
six members to the House of Representatives, the lower house of Japan’s parliament,
the National Diet, for a term of four years. Candidates in each district with the
highest vote count would be elected. The upper house, the House of Councillors,
was elected through a similar multi-member district plurality rule, though its mem-
bers were elected from larger districts for a longer term. Typically, then and now, a
majority coalition in the House of Representatives forms the government and elects
one of its members as prime minister. The prime minister can dissolve the House
of Representatives before its term expires and call for early elections, but not for
the House of Councillors. While the House of Councillors retains considerable leg-
islative power, the House of Representatives prevails in disagreements between the
two chambers on important decisions such as passing a budget, ratifying treaties
and choosing a candidate for prime minister. Moreover, the lower house can over-
ride the upper house’s objection on a regular bill by a two-thirds majority. Given
the dominant role of the House of Representatives, Japan’s constitutional design is
referred to as a “one-and-a-half house solution” by Ackerman (2000). I shall focus
on the House of Representatives in this paper.
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had been the ruling party since 1955.
However, in the 1993 general election, it lost its governing position for the first time.
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A governing coalition was formed by eight small anti-LDP parties. Led by Prime
Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in 1994, the 11-month governing coalition replaced the
previous MMD-SNTV system with a mixed system for the lower house.
Under the reform, the House of Representatives was given 500 seats, of which
300 seats were from single-member districts (SMDs) with a first-past-the-post (FPTP)
rule, while 200 seats were elected from proportional representation (PR) party lists
grouped by 11 regional PR blocks.2 Under the new system, each voter is given two
votes, one for a candidate in her single member district and another for a party
list in her PR block. The SMD vote need not be for a candidate from the same
party as the PR vote. The boundaries of PR blocks do not cross the boundaries
of prefectures, the immediate sub-national level of administrative unit. Conversely,
the boundaries of prefectures do not cross the boundaries of SMDs. Hence, a PR
block contains one or several prefectures, and a prefecture contains several SMDs.
Figure 2.4 is a map showing how Japan is divided into 11 PR blocks, each filled with
different colors. Each PR block consists of one or several prefectures, as delineated
by dashed lines. The number of SMDs in each prefecture in the most recent 2012
election is labeled on top. A fixed number of PR seats is allocated to a PR block
before each election. Parties propose a party list in each PR block to contest for the
PR seats allocated to that block. PR seats in a PR block are allocated to parties
in proportion to their PR vote shares in the block. Vote shares outside a PR block
have no bearing on the allocation of the PR seats within the PR block.
2After the 1996 election, the first after the reform, the number of PR seats was reduced to 180,

























































































































































As in some other mixed-member systems, such as those of Germany and New
Zealand, dual candidacy is permitted. A candidate can be on both the SMD ballot
and the PR list ballot. If a candidate wins a seat from an SMD, she takes that seat
and vacates her position on the party list. If a candidate loses in the SMD race,
she can still obtain a PR seat if her ranking on the PR list is favorable relative to
the number of PR seats her party won in the regional PR block. In Germany and
New Zealand, the allocations of PR seats are used to top up district seats, so that
the overall shares of seats going to each party in the end proportionally reflects vote
shares of parties nationwide. But in Japan’s system, the number of SMD seats (or
constituent seats) and the number of PR seats are fixed. The SMD system and the
PR system are parallel in the sense that the number of PR seats a party obtains
only depends on its performance in the PR vote and the number of SMD seats a
party obtains only depends on its candidates’ performance in SMD races.
Consider further the comparison of Germany and Japan. The Bundestag,
the German Federal Diet, consists of 598 members, with half elected from single
member districts and the other half from party lists, proportionally allocated to
parties according to nationwide party vote shares. If a party obtains 50% of party
votes nationwide and its nominees win 100 seats in the single member districts under
the first-past-the-post rule, the number of PR seats allocated to the party is 199 =
598 / 2 - 100.3 In Japan, on the other hand, the number of PR seats a party wins
is the sum of PR seats won in each PR block, which in turn is determined solely
3In the case that a party has more members elected from SMDs than its overall seat share
implied by the national party vote share, some additional seats known as overhang seats are added
to the 598 regular seats to accommodate the crowd-out of PR seats for other parties that would
otherwise occur.
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by PR vote shares in each block, independent of the number of SMD seats won or
nationwide PR vote shares.4 The number of PR seats, prefectures and SMDs in
each PR block are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Division of Proportional Representation Blocks
Number of # PR Seats # SMDs
PR Block Prefectures 1996 2000 2003 - 2012 Pre-2002 Post-2002
Chugoku 5 13 11 11 21 20
Hokkaido 1 9 8 8 13 12
Hokurikushinetsu 5 13 11 11 20 20
Kinki 6 33 30 29 47 48
Kitakanto 4 21 20 20 31 32
Kyushu 8 23 21 21 38 38
Minamikanto 3 23 21 22 32 34
Shikoku 4 7 6 6 13 13
Tohoku 6 16 14 14 26 25
Tokai 4 23 21 21 34 33
Tokyo 1 19 17 17 25 25
Total 47 200 180 180 300 300
While the SMD system and PR system are parallel in that the allocation of
PR seats across parties does not depend on the outcomes of SMD races, the two
systems are connected in the allocation of intra-party PR seats. A special feature
of the party PR lists is that rankings are partially determined ex ante and partially
determined ex post. Candidates on the PR lists are ranked by their parties before
the election. However, parties can give multiple candidates equal rank on the ballot.
Dual candidates’ ex post ranks within a cluster (conditional on ex ante equal rank)
are determined by their performance in their own SMD, specifically by their vote
4The mapping from PR vote share to PR seat share in a PR block follows the D’Hondt method.
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share divided by the winning candidate’s SMD vote share. The higher is this ratio
(hereafter known as the narrowness-of-defeat ratio or simply the narrowness ratio),
the higher is a dual candidate’s rank within the cluster. For example, suppose all
candidates on a party list are dual candidates who lose their SMD races. Amy ranks
first ex-ante on the list, but Ben, Cameron and David rank equally second ex-ante.
The ex-post ranks of Ben, Cameron and David will be given by their vote shares in
the SMD races as compared to the winning candidates from the respective SMDs.
If their party obtains two seats in the PR block, Amy will get a PR seat regardless
of her narrowness ratio, while the candidate among Ben, Cameron and David with
the highest narrowness ratio will get the second seat.5
If legislators who are defeated in the SMD races but elected through the PR
system are motivated to maintain a local base, such a parallel voting system creates
variation of de facto representation in the lower house across districts. There are
several reasons candidates would have incentives to cater to local interests (McKean
and Scheiner, 2000). First, dual candidacy provides insurance to candidates for a
seat via an alternative route. If a candidate loses the SMD race, she may still be able
obtain a seat through the party list. Secondly, the PR list is partially open in that
a dual candidate’s ranking on the list is partially determined by her performance
in the SMD. Third, new formation of parties and changes of party membership are
relatively frequent in Japan. The Democratic Party of Japan, which recently lost its
5There is one caveat. After the 1996 general election, the election law was amended such
that any candidate who fails to obtain a 10% vote share in the SMD race will be disqualified.
Her position on the PR list would be vacated regardless of her narrowness ratio, and her deposi-
tion for candidacy would be forfeited. This amendment has been taken into consideration in the
implementation of my empirical strategy.
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majority in the 2012 general election, was founded only in 1998. The current third
largest party, the Japan Restoration Party with 54 seats, and the sixth largest party,
the Tomorrow Party of Japan with nine seats, were both founded in 2012. A local
base provides politicians with political capital and puts them in a good bargaining
position should change of party affiliations occur. Fourth, it is not uncommon
in Japan’s political culture that seats are inherited by staffers or children of the
incumbents (Taniguchi, 2008). A local base would facilitate such inheritance.
2.2.3 Data
There have been six general elections for the House of Representatives since the
electoral reform in 1994. They were held in years 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009 and
2012. I downloaded election results and party lists from the website go2senkyo.com
for all six elections, and from the website of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications for the last three. I obtained municipal level voting data from
1996 to 2005 from Asahi Shimbun, one of five major national newspapers in Japan.
Municipal election data for 2009 were complied in part from various websites of
prefectural election commissions. I mainly used the election data from the website
go2senkyo.com, as they were more complete, but verified them with data from the
other two sources, finding few discrepancies.
In these elections, among candidates who lost their SMD races but ran again
in the next election, 88% of challengers who were not members of the Lower House
ran again in the same district, while PR incumbents were 8.6% more likely than
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non-members to run in the same SMD. This difference is statistically significant, as
shown in Table 2.2 using a linear probability model. A logit model gives a similar
result. This suggests that most candidates run in the same district if they run again
in the next election, and that PR incumbents are particularly inclined to do so.6
Fifty-nine percent of candidates contesting for SMD seats since 1994 have been
dual candidates. The percentage has been higher among competitive candidates;
84% of candidates finishing first or second in SMD races have been dual candidates.
Moreover, 81% of candidates on the party lists over this period have also been on
the ballot of an SMD race, suggesting a preference for being elected to an SMD
seat. This is consistent with SMD incumbents having a higher re-election rate
than do PR incumbents. While incumbents of PR seats enjoy substantial electoral
advantages, incumbents of SMD seats have considerably higher probability of getting
re-elected to the lower house. Based on a linear probability model relating re-
election probability to incumbent status, controlling for party-election fixed effects,
the incumbency advantage of SMD incumbents is about 63% to 157% higher than
that of incumbents elected through the party lists. These regression results are
shown in columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.3. Even among incumbents who were elected
in close SMD elections, so that the assignment to SMD seats versus PR seats is close
to random, SMD incumbents had a higher rate of getting re-elected. This is shown
in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.3.
Demographic data and basic public finance data for municipalities were taken
6Unsurprisingly, incumbents of SMD seats almost always ran in the same district from which
they were elected.
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from two sources: the Minryoku database and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications. The Minryoku database was compiled by Asahi Shimbun Pub-
lications Inc. from various governmental agencies. Municipal public expenditure
data and local tax revenue from FY 1997 to FY 2009 were available in the Min-
ryoku database. More detailed breakdowns of revenue and expenditure of municipal




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3.1 Sources of Discontinuities to be Exploited
In light of the above-described electoral rules linking the Majoritarian and the
PR system, which are imposed uniformly across parties, there are two sources of
discontinuity to be exploited for exogenous variation. The first is close narrowness
ratios among ex ante equally ranked dual candidates. To illustrate this, consider
the party list of LDP in the general election of 2009 for the PR Block of Kitakanto
in Table 2.4.7 Pure PR candidate Genichiro Sata occupied the singleton top rank
on the list. After Genichiro Sata, 26 candidates were ranked equally second. They
were each dual candidates, competing in one SMD within the Kitakanto PR block.
On the bottom of the list, two pure PR candidates were ranked 28th and 29th,
respectively.
Twenty seats were allocated to the PR Block of Kitakanto in 2009. LDP won
25.84% of party votes in this PR block, hence obtaining six seats according to the
D’Hondt method. Genichiro Sata took up one PR seat by being on top of the list
as a pure PR candidate, leaving five seats for candidates below him. Three dual
candidates won in their respective SMDs, hence taking the SMD seats and vacating
their positions on the party list. The SMD-losing dual candidates in the second-
rank cluster were then ranked according to their narrowness-of-defeat ratio, i.e.,
their vote share divided by the vote share of the winner in their own district. The
7The PR Block of Kitakanto is north of Tokyo Prefecture, and is painted in orange in Figure 2.4.
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five candidates with highest narrowness ratios obtained the remaining PR seats. The
narrowness ratio of Tsutomu Sato, who took the last PR seat for LDP in Kitakanto,
was 0.781. Yuya Niwa, who had a narrowness ratio of 0.772 and was ranked ex post
immediately below Tsutomu Sato, did not get a PR seat. In this case, Tochigi 4,
the district of Tsutomu Sato, obtained an additional de facto representative through
the PR system, while Ibaraki 6, in which Yuya Niwa competed, did not.
Notice that, given the number of seats a party obtains, the cut-off narrowness
ratio for the party’s last PR seat is potentially determined by order statistics of
the narrowness ratios from all equally ranked candidates in a PR list cluster, rather
than a single number as in the FPTP two-party elections. Determination of the cut
off depends on multiple vote counts among candidates whose identities are ex-ante
uncertain. Therefore, it would be difficult to engage in electoral manipulations just
around the cut-off in order to gain the last PR seat and award an SMD an extra
de facto representative. Endogenous sorting in a small neighborhood of the cut-
off is highly unlikely, avoiding the most dangerous pitfall invalidating a traditional
regression discontinuity design, particularly in studies examining two candidates
contesting under the plurality rule. In the above example, if due to random factors
Yuya Niwa had achieved an additional 0.5 percentage point in vote share, he would
have obtained the last PR seat at the expense of Tsutomu Sato. Notice that Yuya
Niwa actually had a higher vote share than Tsutomu Sato did. The reason he was
not able to obtain the last PR seat is that the winner in Yuya Niwa’s SMD did
better than the winner of Tsutomu Sato’s SMD. Had the winner of Yuya Niwa’s
SMD attained a 3
4
percentage point lower vote share, or had the winner of Tsutomu
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Sato’s SMD achieved a 3
4
percentage point higher vote share, Yuya Niwa would have
obtained the last PR seat instead of Tsutomu Sato. Thus, the winner of the last
PR seat depended on at least four vote counts: Niwa’s and Sato’s votes and the
votes of the winners in their districts. Moreover, the identities of these four vote
counts are only relevant conditional on the LDP obtaining six PR seats and having
four dual candidates with narrowness ratios higher than Tsutomu Sato did, both of
which were uncertain before the election results were revealed.
The second source of discontinuity is close elections in SMD races. A narrow
winner in one SMD could potentially change the representation of another district in
the same PR block, because of its implications for the intra-party allocation of PR
seats. This is because winners of SMD races vacate their positions on the party lists.
To see this operating in reality, consider again the LDP’s party list in Table 2.4.
The SMD-losing candidate with highest narrowness ratio at 0.976 was Fukushiro
Nukaga from district Ibaraki 2. If for random reasons he had obtained an additional
1.2 percentage points in vote share, he would have won the SMD seat and vacated
his position on the PR list. The last PR seat would have then gone to Yuya Niwa. In
such a scenario, the opponent of Fukushiro Nukaga, who would have lost the SMD
race by a narrow margin, would have occupied a high ex post ranking on his party’s
PR list, potentially kicking out another SMD-losing candidate from that party. The
outcome of a narrow election in SMD Ibaraki 2, though perhaps not consequential
for its own representation, thus has a ripple effect on the representation of two other
districts.
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Table 2.4: Party List of LDP for the PR Block of Kitakanto in the General Election
of 2009
Rank Rank
ex Name of Narrowness ex Seat SMD V. Share Winner’s
ante Candidate ratio post won (dual) in SMD v. share
1 G. Sata - 1 PR - - -
2 Y. Obuchi - - SMD Gunma 5 0.710 0.710
2 T. Motegi - - SMD Tochigi 5 0.517 0.517
2 H. Kajiyama - - SMD Ibaraki 4 0.507 0.507
2 F. Nukaga 0.976 2 PR Ibaraki 2 0.479 0.491
2 K. Nagaoka 0.812 3 PR Ibaraki 7 0.301 0.370
2 Y. Shindo 0.801 4 PR Saitama 2 0.401 0.500
2 M. Shibayama 0.797 5 PR Saitama 8 0.391 0.491
2 T. Sato 0.781 6 PR Tochigi 4 0.402 0.515
2 Y. Niwa 0.772 7 - Ibaraki 6 0.420 0.543
2 Y. Yamaguchi 0.770 8 - Saitama 10 0.425 0.551
2 H. Funada 0.765 9 - Tochigi 1 0.413 0.540
2 T. Otsuka 0.728 10 - Saitama 9 0.412 0.567
2 T. Kojima 0.715 11 - Saitama 12 0.409 0.572
2 Y. Tanaka 0.711 12 - Saitama 15 0.371 0.521
2 Y. Hanashi 0.702 13 - Ibaraki 3 0.401 0.571
2 S. Tsuchiya 0.701 14 - Saitama 13 0.361 0.515
2 T. Mitsubayashi 0.687 15 - Saitama 14 0.393 0.572
2 H. Makihara 0.650 16 - Saitama 5 0.385 0.592
2 H. Chuko 0.618 17 - Saitama 4 0.335 0.542
2 H. Imai 0.617 18 - Saitama 3 0.371 0.600
2 N. Akagi 0.612 19 - Ibaraki 1 0.350 0.571
2 H. Okabe 0.594 20 - Ibaraki 5 0.364 0.613
2 K. Nishikawa 0.567 21 - Tochigi 2 0.357 0.629
2 Z. Kaneko 0.476 22 - Saitama 1 0.290 0.609
2 K. Nakane 0.453 23 - Saitama 6 0.306 0.676
2 E. Arai 0.363 24 - Saitama 11 0.256 0.707
28 M. Namiki - 25 - - - -
29 M. Otaka - 26 - - - -
Kitakanto is an area north of the Tokyo prefecture.
SMDs are named with its prefecture followed by the district number in the prefecture.
For example, Gunma 5 is District 5 of Gunma Prefecture;
In the general election of 2009, LDP won 25.84% of party votes in the PR Block of Kitakanto.
Therefore, 6 out of 20 seats in the PR block were allocated to LDP.
Moreover, 3 dual candidates won in their SMDs, thereby vacating their positions on the party list.
The last column is the vote share of the winner in the SMD the dual candidate is contesting.
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There is another source of discontinuity that can potentially be utilized. Folke
(2011) proposes a method of applying the regression discontinuity design in propor-
tional representation systems, exploiting the discontinuous jumps in the mapping
of practically continuous vote shares to discrete seat shares. He then applies this
method using Swedish municipal elections, which have a pure PR system, to study
the effects of party representation on environmental, immigration and tax policies.
The benefit of exploiting such discontinuity in Japan’s case is that it would pro-
vide an extra source of exogenous variation of effective representation due to the
marginal change of PR seats obtained by a party, which may lead to the election
(or non-election) of SMD-losing dual candidates from the affected parties. One cost,
however, is that this strategy would introduce another layer of complexity, as such
discontinuity rests on the particulars of the mapping from the PR vote shares to
the number of PR seats obtained by each party. More importantly, inter-party re-
allocations of PR seats may have wider political and public policy implications than
intra-party reallocations of PR seats across districts. As shown in Folke (2011),
the assignment of a seat in the municipal legislature to parties with different agen-
das has large effects on local immigration and environmental policies. Inter-party
re-allocations of PR seats may also alter coalition formation, regional bargaining
positions, public policy priorities and so on. Exploiting this discontinuity therefore
confounds the distributional consequences of different levels of effective representa-
tion, holding the partisan configuration of a legislature fixed. I shall focus instead
on the cross-municipality variation of effective representation induced by intra-party
assignment of PR seats.
82
2.3.2 A Quasi-Randomized Sample of Districts
To motivate how I incorporate the two sources of discontinuity in my empiri-
cal work, consider the following thought experiments. Imagine that due to random
factors, such as weather on the election day affecting turnout of voters for candi-
dates differentially, the vote shares of the winner and the runner-up candidate in
a particular SMD are perturbed. In particular, suppose I transfer an amount ε of
vote share from one candidate to the other. This may or may not affect the out-
come of the perturbed SMD race. If under this counter-factual vote share profile,
the allocation of representatives to districts via the PR system does not change,
the district is not assigned to either the treatment or control sample. However,
if a district having exactly one additional representative through the PR system
loses it in the counter-factual, the district is tagged as randomly assigned to the
treatment of having two effective representatives. If a district having no additional
de facto representative through the PR system gains one in the counter-factual,
the district is tagged as randomly assigned to the control group of having a sin-
gle representative. The counter-factual vote shares may result in changes in district
representation due to either or both of the above-mentioned sources of discontinuity.
To construct a sample of districts with quasi-randomly assigned treatment status,
I carry out the concrete version of the above thought experiments on each SMD in
each election, perturbing one SMD election at a time and holding everything else
constant. This generates a set of treatment districts (i.e., districts having exactly
one PR representative who would lose it in at least one counter-factual) and a set of
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control districts (i.e., districts having no PR representative who would gain one in
at least one counter-factual). Note that a district may qualify for treatment status
under multiple perturbations to different elections, but such districts are not double
counted in the quasi-randomization sample.
I focus on the margin of having zero or one PR representative, so that districts
in the quasi-randomized sample have identical and exactly one treatment status out
of two, regardless of which thought experiment generates the treatment status. This
avoids complexity arising from situations such as a district having a treatment status
at the 0–1 margin but a control status at the 1–2 margin. Moreover, it is so rare
that a district could gain or potentially gain two PR representatives that precise
estimation at margins other than zero-one is difficult. Furthermore, it should be
noted that a given perturbation does not always generate treatment and control
districts in pair. It is possible that a vote share perturbation generates a treated
district but not a control district, and vice versa, because a dual candidate may gain
or lose a seat to a pure PR candidate.
In the regression discontinuity (RD) design of Lee et al. (2004), who study
U.S. House elections, the authors suggest a non-parametric estimate using close
elections with a margin of victory of less than 4% in the two-party vote share. In
those elections, election outcomes are considered to be as if random. Since vote share
transfers of up to 2% between the two candidates are sufficient to alter the outcomes
in these elections, I similarly use 2% perturbations of vote shares to construct the
quasi-randomized sample, i.e. ε = 0.02 . Table 2.5 shows how many SMDs have
additional representatives after each election, in both the full sample and the quasi-
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randomized sample.
Table 2.5: Distribution of SMDs with PR-elected Representatives
Full Sample
Number of SMDs by Election
Number of Additional PR Representatives 1996 2000 2003 2005 2009 2012
0 (without dual candidate) 12 5 3 0 0 2
0 (with dual candidate) 212 220 182 186 206 183
1 70 69 111 111 91 105
2 6 6 4 3 3 10
Total 300 300 300 300 300 300
Quasi-Randomized Sample
Number of SMDs by Election
Treatment Status 1996 2000 2003 2005 2009 2012
One Additional PR Representative 24 24 57 37 32 37
No Additional PR Representative 54 69 66 80 69 70
Total 78 93 123 117 101 107
To check whether the constructed quasi-randomized sample has close to ran-
dom assignments of treatment status (i.e., having a PR representative or not), I
examine the correlations between treatment status and a list of demographic and
political variables. This list includes municipal population growth rate, area of the
municipality, population density, number of SMD candidates, total vote share of the
top two SMD candidates, whether the SMD elected a LDP candidate and whether
the SMD elected a candidate of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which was
the main opposition party for most of the sample period. Results are reported in
Table 2.6. None but the dummy variable indicating a DPJ winner are found to be
significantly correlated with the treatment status of a municipality at the 10% level.
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Table 2.6: Quasi-Randomization Check: Whether Treatment Status Correlates with
Observables
Univariate Explanatory Variable:
=1 if having an PR Representative;
=0 otherwise
Dependent Variable Coefficient S.E. p-value # Obs.
Municipal Level:
Population (log) -0.0053 0.1018 0.9584 10208
Taxable Income per capita (log) -0.0201 0.0233 0.3889 10156
Population Share of Age 0 to 4 0.0006 0.0006 0.2957 10208
Population Share of Age 5 to 19 0.0004 0.0023 0.8558 10208
Population Share of Age 65 + 0.0007 0.0056 0.8965 10208
Area (log) 0.0310 0.1068 0.7714 9251
Population Density (log) -0.0483 0.1739 0.7813 9251
Population Growth Rate -0.0004 0.0013 0.7645 9336
District Level:
Size of District Electorate (log) -0.0153 0.0184 0.4067 512
Number of SMD Candidates -0.0299 0.0851 0.7254 619
Vote Share of Top 2 SMD Cand. 0.0043 0.0100 0.6640 619
LDP Candidate won -0.0332 0.0422 0.4313 619
DPJ Candidate won -0.0714* 0.0395 0.0710 619
Voter Turnout Rate 0.0034 0.0063 0.5899 512
SMD Winner in Governing Coalition -0.0542 0.0424 0.2014 619
LDP Candidate equals 1 if the SMD seat is won by a LDP candidate; 0 otherwise;
DPJ Candidate equals 1 if the SMD seat is won by a DPJ candidate; 0 otherwise;
The sample is the quasi-randomized sample constructed with 2% vote share perturbations;
For the upper panel, the unit of observation are municipalities, where treatment status is identical
for all municipalities within an SMD;
Standard errors in this case are robust to clustering two-way on municipality and on SMD-House term.
For the lower panel, the unit of observation are district;
Standard errors in the case are heteroskedasticity robust;
on SMD–House term.
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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2.4 Additional Representation and Local Public Finance
2.4.1 Municipal Public Expenditure
To estimate the effect of having an additional de facto representative through
the PR system on public expenditure, my main specification is
log(yit) = α + δPRit +X
′
itβ + µi + πt + εit (2.1)
where yit is the public expenditure per capita for municipality i in fiscal year t;
PRit is a dummy variable equal to one if municipality i has one or more SMD-
losing but PR-elected representative at time t and zero otherwise; Xit is a vector of
demographic and economic controls; µi is a municipal fixed effect and πt is a year
fixed effect.
First, in Table 2.7, I present coefficient estimates using the full sample of mu-
nicipalities, except a few large municipalities that span multiple districts, from FY
1997 to FY 2010. It should be noted that municipalities are rarely split into multiple
SMDs except when the municipality is very large in population. If time-invariant
heterogeneity across municipalities is correlated with having an additional PR rep-
resentative, but time-varying factors are not, this specification provides consistent
estimates through the inclusion of municipal fixed effects. For comparison with the
later results from the quasi-randomized sample, here PRit is a dummy variable equal
to one if municipality i has one or two SMD-losing but PR-elected representatives
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and zero otherwise. Adding another dummy variable indicating having two extra
PR representatives does not change the results. As reported in Table 2.8, having
two extra PR representatives rather than one further increases public expenditure,
but its effect is imprecisely estimated due to the small number of districts having
two PR representatives. In the full sample, municipalities with at least one PR
representative have a public expenditure per capita 0.86% higher than comparable
municipalities without a PR representative; this result is significant at the 5% level.
To control for economies of scale in public goods provision, the cost of providing
public goods and the demand for public goods, I include log municipal population,
log taxable income per capita and population shares of age groups 0–4, 5–19 and
65+ as control variables. To control for and compare the traditionally estimated
effect of mal-apportionment, I include the log voting population of the SMD the
municipality belongs to. The estimates of the main representation effect are robust
to the inclusion of these controls. Here, as in later estimations, standard errors
are robust to two-way clustering on municipality and on PR block–House term.
This allows for time series correlation within municipalities and cross-municipality
correlation within a PR-block in a House term. There may be cross-municipality
correlation within a PR block–House term because some municipalities share the
same representatives or the elections of PR representatives are correlated within a
PR block.8
8One-way clustering, either on municipality or PR block–House term, results in smaller stan-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One potential concern about these estimates is that there may be unobserved
time-varying factors that correlate with both the public expenditure in a district
and the probability that the district has a PR representative. For example, rec-
ognizing that a PR representative could bring in more public spending, a district
with temporarily high demand for public spending may vote strategically for the
runner-up to increase its chance of having a PR representative. If the high demand
for public spending, say due to a natural disaster, would be partially fulfilled even
in the absence of a PR representative, the estimated effect of having a PR repre-
sentative on public expenditure would be biased upward. On the other hand, if a
district’s SMD representative is very successful at bringing in pork barrel spending
and is rewarded electorally by voters, the narrowness ratio of the runner-up would
be low and the district may not have a PR representative. If there is persistence in
how much pork barrel spending an SMD representative brings, having a PR repre-
sentative would be negatively correlated with the persistent unobserved component
of municipal spending. Using the full sample, the estimated effect of having a PR
representative on expenditure would be biased downward. To address such concerns,
I estimate the effect of having a PR representative on public expenditure using the
quasi-randomized sample described in the previous section. Notice that, even if vot-
ers are strategic as described above, this sample still provides a consistent estimate
as long as voters are not able to coordinate precisely to gain a PR representative
by foreseeing small electoral shocks. There are reasons to believe that voters are
not that sophisticated. A district typically has more than 300 thousand eligible
voters. It is extremely difficult for voters to coordinate precisely to ensure that their
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SMD-losing candidate is sorted into one side of the cut-off for the PR seat in the
face of small electoral shocks. Polling and forecasting prior to elections are not very
extensive in Japan. For example, the Democratic Party of Japan was surprised by
its own success in the 2009 general election. Had it listed two more names on its
party list in the Kinki PR block, it could have obtained two more PR seats.
Compared with the full sample, SMD races in the quasi-randomized sample
are more competitive. The average margin of victory is 11.5%, compared to 15.5%
in the full sample. However, it should be noted that the most competitive districts
are unlikely to be included in the quasi-randomized sample. Eighty-four percent of
runners-up are dual candidates, and among these, one third are elected to a PR
seat. If two dual candidates, the winner and the runner-up, have roughly equal
votes, whoever loses in the SMD race would have a high narrowness ratio and hence
would rank high among her ex ante equally ranked peers. Thus, districts that are
highly competitive will have a PR representative with a probability close to one
regardless of who wins the SMD seat. A small perturbation of vote share would not
be sufficient to deprive them of a PR representative. Similarly, very safe districts
are excluded from the quasi-randomized sample because they require huge electoral
shocks in order to elect one of their candidates through the PR system. Therefore,
the quasi-randomized sample contains SMDs with meaningful but not the most
intensive electoral competition. Inferences based on this sample should be useful
for addressing broader issues. For example, the exogenous variation of electoral
strength studied in Lee et al. (2004) comes from the closest elections in the past and
the incumbency advantages the narrow winners enjoy subsequently. They infer that
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electoral strength has limited influence on the voting records of legislators compared
with a legislator’s identity. They conclude that voters elect candidates already likely
to represent their preferred policies, rather than using election pressure to convince
representatives to chose their preferred policies. However, this inference need not
apply to districts where elections are less competitive. If polarized districts have
more competitive elections, policy moderation there may provoke backlash among
an incumbent’s base voters, harming their electoral prospects via primary challenges
or lower turnout from core supporters. This would be consistent with Gerber and
Lewis’ (2004) finding that legislators’ positions diverge more from the preference of
median voters in more heterogeneous districts.
Table 2.9 reports estimates using the same specification given by equation
(1), but with the quasi-randomized sample. In the baseline specification with fixed
effects but no other controls, municipalities with a PR representative are estimated
to have on average 1.82% more public expenditure per capita, which is significant
at the 1% level. The magnitude and statistical significance of the main coefficient
estimate remain stable with the addition of controls. Notice that in the quasi-
randomized sample, controls are not in principle necessary for identification even if
they are correlated with public expenditure; in practice, adding controls might help
to reduce noise and can help us assess the robustness of the estimates in the finite
sample. In column (6) of Table 2.9, the voting population of the SMD containing the
municipality has a coefficient of -0.2000, significant at the 5% level. This contrasts
with the insignificant estimate of -0.0068 from the full sample. The instability of
estimates for this coefficient may suggest that the size of the electorate or district
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population may proxy for other variables, or it may suggest that the size of electorate


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.2 Transfers from Central Government
Ideally, one would like to use data on discretionary transfers from the national
government to the municipal governments as a dependent variable to confirm the
political cause of higher municipal public expenditure. However, I only have cate-
gorical expenditure data for a subset of the sample period, and even in this data,
discretionary transfers cannot be clearly identified. Moreover, targeted transfers
may not be carried out transparently through discretionary items, but rather in a
more disguised fashion by tampering with parameters used to determine transfers in
various programs. To see if having an additional PR representative affects the total
amount of transfers from the national government, I re-estimate Eq. (1) but using
log per-capita transfers from the national government as the dependent variable.
Using the quasi-randomized sample from FY 2002 to FY 2010, I find that having
an additional PR representative has a positive effect of 1.7% to 1.9%, depending
on specification. However, these coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Standard
errors robust to two-way clustering are about 1.1%, giving most estimates a p-value
around 10% if the coefficient is tested against zero. Table 2.10 reports these results,
as well as estimates using the full sample over the abbreviated sample period FY
2002 – FY 2010. Results from the full sample are broadly similar, with estimates
ranging from 0.87% to 0.93% and mostly significant at the 5% level.
Note that the estimates in Table 2.10 use only a subset of the time periods
available in the original sample, due to data limitations. However, since transfers
from prefectural governments only account for a small share of revenue for municipal
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governments (see Figure 2.2), I can use the difference between total local public
expenditure and local tax revenue to proxy the amount of transfers from the national
government for a longer sample period. This alternative measure is highly correlated
(ρ = 0.951) with the direct measure of transfers from the national government over
the period FY 2002 to FY2010. Estimation results using the alternative measure
of transfers over the longer sample period FY 1997 to FY 2012 are reported in
Table 2.11. In the full sample, estimates from various specifications suggest that an
extra representative results in a 1.1% to 1.2% increase of transfers, with all estimates
significant at the 5% level. In the quasi-randomized sample, the effect is much larger,
ranging from 2.1% to 2.6%, again all significant at the 5% level. Therefore, these
results provide evidence that the higher public expenditure associated with having

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To see whether the results are driven by small municipalities, I re-estimate
the baseline results from Table 2.7 and Table 2.9 with each municipality weighted
by its population. Results are shown in Table 2.12. Estimates remain significant at
conventional levels. In the full sample, the estimated magnitude is slightly higher
than the unweighted results. With the quasi-randomized sample, the estimated
magnitude drops modestly. One possible explanation is that smaller municipalities
are easier to target for electorally motivated transfers.
From 2003 to 2004, there was a large wave of municipal mergers (see, for
example, Weese, 2011). The number of municipalities decreased from more than
3,200 to less than 2,000. While this should not affect the consistency of estimates
from the quasi-randomized sample, and while the municipal fixed effects reflect
any change of municipal identity, mergers may bias the estimates from the full
sample if they are correlated with having a PR representative. For example, there
is a trade-off in the number of jurisdictions between economies of scale in public
goods provision and heterogeneity of preferences (Alesina and La Farrara, 2000;
Weese, 2012). If economic integration after mergers increases public expenditure
over time and if political integration increases a district’s chance of having a PR
representative, the estimated effect of having a PR representative may be biased
upward. In estimates reported in the upper panel of Table 2.13, I re-estimate the
effect of having a PR representative on per capita public expenditure, as well as the
per capita gap between public expenditure and local tax revenue, using a balanced
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panel of municipalities that are in the sample for the entire period. In this sample,
no municipality is involved in any merger over the sample period. The effects are
less precisely estimated, but are quantitatively similar to the baseline results.
In the quasi-randomized sample, a municipality enters the sample following
an election in which it received a treatment status or control status for some per-
turbation and exits if it does not receive a treatment or control status in the next
election. One may be concerned that municipalities with infrequent presence in the
quasi-randomized sample are considerably different from other municipalities in the
randomized sample and that such unobserved characteristics drive the results. For
example, suppose that voters are aware that additional representation through the
PR system is able to bring in additional funding from the national government, and
vote strategically to lower the margin of victory for the SMD winner. This by itself
would not invalidate my identification strategy as long as voters are not able to
coordinate and precisely control the allocation of vote shares to their candidates.
But if municipalities only exercise strategic voting when there is a high demand
for public expenditure and when voters anticipate that this demand will be met
when a candidate who lost in that SMD is elected through the PR system, the esti-
mated average treatment effect could be largely driven by these municipalities with
a high treatment effect. I therefore re-estimate the treatment effect of having a PR
representative using a sub-sample of the quasi-randomized sample, including only
municipalities present in the sample for at least half of the sample period (i.e. seven
years). The estimates, shown in the second part of Table 2.13, are quantitatively
similar to the results in the full sample and remain significant at the 5% level.
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In the full sample, local political characteristics may correlate with having a
PR representative, hence confounding the estimated causal impact of representation.
In the quasi-randomized sample, this is not a concern in principle as long as the vote
share perturbations are small enough. To see whether political characteristics are
a concern in a finite sample, I include an alternative set of political controls. They
include the vote share of the SMD winner, the vote margin difference between the
SMD winner and SMD runner-up and the narrowness ratio of the runner-up in the
SMD. Results reported in Table 2.14 show that the main estimates of interest are



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.4 Public Works, Welfare Expenditure and Government Payroll
While having an additional de facto representative increases total municipal
public expenditure by about 1.8%, the extent to which this represents an increase
of discretionary spending is unclear. The Ministry of Finance classifies spending
into three types: discretionary spending, compulsory spending and other. Discre-
tionary expenditures are mainly on public infrastructure. Compulsory spending
consists of debt service, wages and salaries of government employees, and welfare
spending. Nation-wide, public works expenditure accounts for about 15% of total
municipal expenditure. Welfare spending and government payroll account for 15%
and 19%, respectively. Table 2.15 shows the estimated impact of having an addi-
tional representative on per-capita municipal expenditure on public works, welfare
and payroll, respectively. Estimates from the quasi-randomized sample suggest that
an additional representative increases public works spending by as much as 8%,
while reducing welfare spending by about 2%. This is consistent with the view
that public works in Japan often function as job support programs (Schlesinger,
1999). Municipal governments in Japan have little authority in setting welfare poli-
cies. The scope, eligibility criteria and payment standards for welfare are set by
the national government in a fairly uniform manner, though with some regional ad-
justments reflecting variations in the cost of living. Because public works spending
provides jobs and economic stimulus in local areas, fewer people would need or be
eligible for welfare, which in turn lowers welfare expenditure administrated by the
municipal government. Having a PR representative has no significant effect on the
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payroll of municipal employees. In unreported results, I do not find any significant
effect on the numbers of temporary or permanent government employees either.
This result suggests that higher expenditure is not driven by patronage spending
through government employment. This result is consistent with the fact that, ex-
cept in the largest cities like Tokyo or Osaka, most candidates for local government
are non-partisan or are affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party, which has
little presence in national politics. Therefore, local officials are unlikely to engage
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5 Partisan Affiliation and Legislative Bargaining
In the legislative bargaining framework of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), repre-
sentatives join a minimum winning coalition to gain rents. An agenda setter who
proposes how to split a fixed pie is able to extract more rents. Members of the
majority party often have a better chance to be recognized as agenda setters and,
therefore, receive more rents. Albouy (2013) finds evidence supporting this model.
He finds that states with a larger portion of their delegates belonging to the majority
party of the United States Congress receive a larger amount of federal grants.
In the presence of party discipline, however, it is less clear whether a typical
representative is able to receive a larger amount of rents if he or she is affiliated with
the majority party or is a member of the governing coalition. The impact of party
affiliation on rents depends on the source of party discipline. Since parties are both
legislative institutions and electoral institutions, there are two interconnected but
conceptually distinct aspects of party discipline, namely legislative party discipline
and electoral party discipline (Myerson, 1997). With legislative party discipline,
legislators are expected to vote with their party. With electoral party discipline,
legislators rely on their party to be elected. For example, in a proportional rep-
resentation system where voters vote only for parties and parties have full control
over the ranking of candidates on a party list, electoral party discipline is extremely
strong, as parties decide the electoral fates of candidates.
Diermeier and Feddersen (1998) provide insight on how legislative party dis-
cipline can arise in a parliamentary system, even without electoral party discipline.
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A prominent feature of parliamentary systems is the vote of confidence procedure.
A governing coalition can attach a vote of confidence to any legislation, so that a
failure of passage induces a dissolution of the governing coalition. Since members
of the governing coalition have a better chance to be recognized as agenda setters,
and therefore to extract more rents, members of the governing coalition have greater
continuation value under the current government than non-members do. Thus, they
have more incentive to vote with the proposed rent distribution and sustain the
current government. Therefore, legislative party discipline arises and, as a conse-
quence, members of the governing coalition are able to extract more rents than in
non-parliamentary settings.
On the other hand, if parties have strong control over the electoral fate of
representatives, they are able to impose legislative party discipline over their mem-
bers. In this case, parties or factions may act in unison, and legislative bargaining is
likely to happen between leaders of parties or factions. Intra-party or intra-faction
bargaining then decides how much a representative receives in rents. It is unclear
in this case whether a typical member of the governing coalition would receive more
rents. In the extreme case where party leaders retain all rents, having an extra
representative may not increase the public spending in a district.
Though some argue that Japanese politics has become more party-centered
since the electoral reform in 1994 (e.g., Rosenbluth et al., 2010), Japanese politics
has traditionally been personalistic, in that personal characteristics of candidates
and personal votes are much more salient than party platforms in elections. How-
ever, legislative party discipline has been strict (Hirano et al., 2011). Only in rare
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occasions is the ruling coalition unable to rely on votes from its members to pass
legislation. One example in which party discipline failed was the privatization re-
form of Japan Post in 2005, after which Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expelled
rebels from his party and called an early election (Nemoto et al., 2008). Japan has
a parliamentary system with a vote of confidence procedure. It also has strict cam-
paign finance laws favoring parties over individual politicians. For example, public
funds subsidizing political campaigns are available to qualified parties, but not to
individual candidates. Individual politicians cannot legally accept campaign contri-
butions from corporations, labor unions, and other organizations. Therefore, it is
unclear to what extent the legislative party discipline in Japan can be attributed to
the endogenous bargaining cohesion emphasized in Diermeier and Feddersen (1998),
or to the presence of electoral institutions advantaging parties.
To see whether having a representative in the governing coalition increases
municipal spending, I extend the baseline specifications by adding two dummy vari-
ables. The first equals one if the SMD representative belongs the governing coalition
and zero otherwise. The second equals one if a municipality has a PR representative
belonging to the governing coalition and zero otherwise. Results using the quasi-
randomized sample are reported in Table 2.16. Having an SMD representative in
the governing coalition increases per capita municipal expenditure by about 1.5% to
1.9%, which is significant at 10%. Having a PR representative in the governing coali-
tion increases per capita municipal expenditure more than having a non-governing
PR representative, by about 0.7% to 1.4%, although the estimates are not always sig-
nificant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with Albouy’s (2013) findings for
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the U.S. However, even if the PR representative is not from the governing coalition,
having a PR representative still increases per-capita municipal public expenditure
by about 1.5%, which suggests that a better chance of having a representative in
the governing coalition is not the main driver of my baseline results.
The above results suggest that representatives are able to share some rents
obtained by their parties or factions. In this case, the rents obtained by SMD
representatives and by PR representatives from the same party but from different
districts should be positively correlated. Since the bargaining power of a party
could change from year to year even within a parliamentary term, I test the above
prediction by comparing the party-year fixed effects of SMD representatives and
party-year fixed effects of PR representatives. In particular, I estimate the following
specification using the quasi-randomized sample:
















itβ + µi + πt + εit (2.2)
where yit is the public expenditure per capita for municipality i in fiscal year t; D
SMD
pit
is a dummy variable equal to one if municipality i has an SMD representative from
party p at time t and zero otherwise; δSMDpt then is a party-year fixed effect for
municipality i with an SMD representative from party p in fiscal year t; similarly,
DPRpit is a dummy variable equal to one if municipality i has an PR representative
from party p at time t and zero otherwise; then δPRpt is a party-year fixed effect
for municipality i with a PR representative from party p in fiscal year t, which is
equal to zero if municipality i does not have a PR representative; Xit is a vector
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of demographic and economic controls included in column (6) of Table 2.9; µi is a
municipal fixed effect and πt is a year fixed effect. The specification is estimated
using dummy variables indicating party-year of the SMD representative and the PR
representative (if any).
Figure 2.5 plots estimated the party-year fixed effects of PR representatives
δPRpt against the estimated party-year fixed effects of SMD representatives δ
SMD
pt . In
this figure, I limit my attention to the two major parties, the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), because the other parties
have small numbers of SMD representatives and PR representatives in a typical
year. The estimated party-year fixed effects δPRpt and δ
SMD
pt are positively correlated.
This suggests that, even where party discipline prompts legislators to vote along the
party line, an extra representative is able to provide greater public expenditure by











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the classical Hotelling–Downs paradigm (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957),
the platforms of two candidates competing for office converge at the position most
preferred by the median voter in a one-dimensional policy space. With a multi-
dimensional policy space, however, policy convergence need not occur (Krasa and
Polborn, 2012). Empirical observation often suggests non-convergence of policy
choices by politicians. Using detailed referendum voting records in Los Angeles
County to measure voter preferences, Gerber and Lewis (2004) find that, in more
heterogeneous districts, the voting records of legislators are more distant from the
positions preferred by the median voters. In other words, electoral competition is
a weaker force in heterogeneous districts for driving convergence in policy choices.
Lee et al. (2004) find that the electoral strength of members of the U.S. House of
Representatives explains little of the variation in their voting records.
These findings suggest that voters affect policies primarily by electing repre-
sentatives with fixed preferences, rather than by using elections to pressure repre-
sentatives to adopt their preferred positions. In such a citizen–candidate framework
(Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997), some segments of voters have
preferences that are more aligned with the preference of their representatives than
other voters, and hence these voters are better represented. Overall, this literature
suggests that within-district heterogeneity affects how a district is represented.
In the natural experiment I study here, if a district has a PR representative,
the PR representative would be from a party different from that of the SMD rep-
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resentative. This is because parties do not nominate more than one candidate to
compete for an SMD seat. The losing candidate and winning candidate are neces-
sarily from two different parties.9 This fact has two implications. First, when the
runner-up of an SMD race is elected to a PR seat, voters with preferences closer
to the runner-up than to the SMD winner are better represented. The gain in the
effective preference representation from having a PR representative is potentially
larger for heterogeneous districts.
To estimate whether within-district heterogeneity affects the impact of PR
representation on municipal spending, I proxy for within-district heterogeneity us-
ing the within-district standard deviations across municipalities of the municipal
demographic controls used in the main estimations (i.e., population, income and
age profile), as well as the share of local tax revenue in total municipal public ex-
penditure. I then normalize these measures of within-district heterogeneity to have
mean zero and standard deviation of one, and interact them with the dummy vari-
able for having a PR representative or not. The use of cross-municipality differences
to measure within-district heterogeneity is justified on two grounds. First, it may
not be feasible for legislators to target groups within a municipality, while it may
be feasible to target municipalities. In this case, within-district cross-municipality
heterogeneity is first-order important. Second, in the presence of Tiebout sorting,
within-district cross-municipality differences are positively correlated with within-
district heterogeneity in preferences.
I find that the effect of having a PR representative on municipal expenditure
9Candidates may also run as independents for an SMD seat.
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is larger in districts that are more heterogeneous among the municipalities they
contain. As reported in Table 2.17, measures of within-district heterogeneity, ex-
cept for per-capita income, have small and insignificant direct effects on per-capita
municipal expenditure. However, their interactions with the treatment dummy for
PR representation are always positive, and all but the interactions with log income
per capita and the share of local tax revenue in expenditure are significant at 1%,
where later is significant at 10%. Moreover, the magnitudes of these interactions
are large. For example, the treatment effect almost doubles in districts that are one
standard deviation higher than the national average in the heterogeneity measure
for the share of population aged 65 years or more. In unreported results, when
the treatment dummy of having a PR representative is interacted with the levels
of these municipal control variables, the interaction terms have small coefficients
and are never significant. Thus, these results are not mechanically driven by any
heterogeneous treatment effect along these demographic variables.
However, it is unlikely that representatives distribute public spending to their
constituents purely according to their own preferences, ignoring their electoral sit-
uation. The second implication of the partisan difference between the SMD and
PR representatives is that having a PR representative weakens the incumbency
advantage of the SMD representative in the following election. Incumbents enjoy
electoral advantages over challengers for reasons such as better name recognition
among voters and access to pork barrel spending as an electoral instrument. When
the challenger to an SMD incumbent is a PR representative, the SMD incumbent no
longer has these advantages and hence is subject to greater electoral competition.
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Using the quasi-randomized sample and a linear probability model, I estimate
the effects of having a PR representative on the electoral performance of both SMD
winners and runners-up in the following election. Results are shown in Table 2.18.
I find that when a runner-up in an SMD race is elected to a PR seat, she is about
50% more likely to run again in the following election, 70% more likely to be elected
to an SMD seat and 50% more likely to be elected to any seat. These effects are
significant at 1%. On the other hand, the winner of the SMD race is about 6%
less likely to run again in the following election and about 15% less likely to be
re-elected to an SMD seat. These effects are marginally significant at 10%. These
findings suggest that being a PR representative confer an incumbency advantage on
the runner-up, which intensifies the electoral competition between the SMD winner
and the runner-up in the next election.
The analysis above suggests that having a PR representative might change the
electoral incentives of candidates and might differentially affect municipalities within
a district. In the following section, I examine the differential impacts of having a




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.7 Targeting: Swing versus Core
In empirical studies measuring representation as the ratio between the number
of representatives and the size of the electorate, an implicit assumption is that the
quantity of representatives is first-order important. However, the results in the last
section suggest that the quality of representation is also important. Since parties
do not nominate more than one candidate in an SMD race, a PR-elected candidate
will be from a party other than that of the SMD winner. Voters who preferred
the PR-elected candidate in the SMD race generally have interests different from
those who voted for the SMD winner. A candidate losing the SMD race but elected
through the party list affords her supporters representation in the legislature. The
additional representation brings higher spending to the district, the more so in more
heterogeneous districts. In other words, representation matters, but how much it
matters may depend on how heterogeneous the district is.
However, voters’ interests are likely both economic and ideological. Ideological
affinity with a representative does not necessarily imply favorable treatment in the
distributive policies pursued by that representative, specially for policies regarding
tactical (pork barrel) spending. Theoretical arguments have been made on both
sides about whether politicians will allocate tactical spending to swing voters or
to their core supporters (e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull, 1993; Cox and McCubbins,
1986). In a general framework, Dixit and Londregan (1996) model how two parties
compete for vote shares by promising pork barrel spending to groups with different
partisan affinity. When the two parties are symmetric in their ability to deliver pork
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spending to different groups, the parties will target groups containing a large share
of swing voters (i.e., voters with weak predisposition toward a particular party).
However, when parties are more efficient in delivering pork spending to their core
supporters, perhaps due to their better understanding of what kind of public goods
their core supporters want, spending is tilted toward groups with a large number
of core supporters for the respective party. Existing evidence tends to support the
notion that spending is targeted toward swing voters. For example, Arulampalam et
al. (2009) find for India that swing states aligned with the central government receive
more grants. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find that the central government of
Sweden is more likely to provide temporary grants to municipalities with a large
fraction of swing voters.
In order to examine whether having a PR representative results in increased
transfers to the core voters or swing voters with in a district, I measure the swingness
of a municipality by the vote share difference between the SMD winner and the
runner-up in that municipality in the last election. While politicians may want in
principle to target swing voters within a municipality overwhelmingly voting for one
candidate, the non-partisan nature of local politics in Japan make such targeting
difficult to carry out in practice. I will focus on the quasi-randomized sample. In
this sample, the PR-elected candidates are almost always the runners-up, making
the vote share margins in municipalities comparable between the treatment group
and control group. In the eight cases where the PR-elected candidates was not the
runners-up, most were closely third. Dropping these observations had little effect on
the estimates. I extend the baseline specification to include a quadratic polynomial
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of this municipal vote share margin and its interaction with the dummy variable for















where as before yit is public expenditure per capita for municipality i in fiscal year
t; PRit is a dummy variable equal to one if municipality i has an SMD-losing but
PR-elected representative at time t and zero otherwise; Xit is a vector of controls;
µi is a municipal fixed effect; πt is a year fixed effect; and MMit is the difference
of vote share between the SMD winner and runner-up in the municipality in the
last election (hereafter municipal margin). Unlike the victory margin in the whole
district, this municipal margin can be positive or negative. A negative municipal
margin indicates a stronghold for the runner-up. If spending is targeted to swing
voters, I expect λ2 < 0 and λ2 + δ2 < 0. On the other hand, if spending is targeted
to core supporters, I expect λ1MMit +λ2MM
2
it to be monotonically increasing over
the theoretical support of MMit, i.e. [−1, 1]. Moreover, the quadratic function of
MMit when a municipality has a PR representative should have a U-shape, i.e.,
λ2 + δ2 > 0
−1 < −λ1 + δ1
λ2 + δ2
< 1
In order to make sure that the municipal vote share margin is not capturing a non-
linear effect of the district-wise margin of victory for the SMD winner, I include a
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quadratic polynomial of the district-wide margin in one specification. In another
specification, I control for both the vote share of the SMD winner and that of the
SMD runner-up, in case the victory margin is inadequate for measuring the electoral
safety of the SMD representative. As reported in Table 2.19, none of these controls
is significant in predicting municipal expenditures. In the first three columns of Ta-
ble 2.19, I report results of regressions restricting all coefficients of quadratic terms
to zero. In municipalities with no PR representative, the municipal margin has
positive but small and insignificant effects on municipal expenditure. Having a PR
representative has little impact on the effects of the municipal margin. The last
three columns of Table 2.19 add quadratic terms. The results suggest no apparent
nonlinear relationship between municipal margin and municipal expenditure when
there is no PR representative. However, within districts having a PR represen-
tative, there is a significant quadratic relationship between municipal margin and
municipal expenditure. The estimates imply that municipalities that vote heavily
for either the SMD winner or the runner-up have more spending. In municipali-
ties where the SMD winner and runner-up obtain equal vote shares, having a PR
representative increases municipal expenditure by 1%. However, in municipalities
where the runner-up outperforms the winner by 10 percentage points, having a PR
representative increases expenditure by 2.3%.
In the top-left panel of Figure 2.6, I plot the fitted quadratic relationship
between municipal margin and municipal expenditure, for the cases in which the
municipality does and does not have a PR representative. Controls and fixed effects
are set to zero for this graph. The kernel density of the municipal margin is plotted
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in the background. Moreover, in subsequent columns I set the dependent variable to
be transfers from the central government or public works expenditure, respectively,
both in log per capita terms. The specifications are otherwise the same as in Eq. (2)
and column (4) of Table 2.19. Alternative choices of controls as listed in Table 2.19
have little impact on the relationship between municipal margin and the dependent
variable. The regression results are plotted in the middle and right graphs on the top
row of Figure 2.6. The patterns across these three graphs are similar. Having a PR
representative increases spending and transfers in municipalities where the runner-
up did especially well. To examine whether this result is due to a misspecification of
quadratic polynomial, I replace the quadratic polynomial with a cubic spline with
internal knots at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the municipal margin. The
regression results for municipal expenditure, transfers and public works spending (all
in log per capita terms) respectively are plotted in the bottom row of Figure 2.6.
The cubic results confirm the bipolar effects of having a PR representative.
Interestingly, having a PR representative increases spending not only in munic-
ipalities where the PR representative had strong support, but also in municipalities
where the SMD winner had a large lead. In other words, the presence of a PR
representative shifts distributive politics toward core targeting. This result suggests
that incumbents do not provide pork simply to carry out promises made when they
ran for election; rather, they distribute pork in reaction to their electoral situation.
My interpretation is that politicians distribute pork barrel spending to mobilize
voters. With the exception of Drazen and Eslava (2012), models of distributive
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as given, politicians distribute pork barrel spending to groups containing a large
fraction of swing voters because the spending could switch a large number of votes.
If the two candidates are symmetric and able to credibly promise an allocation
of spending, this vote-buying incentive favors swing groups in distributive politics
(Dixit and Londregan, 1996). However, in reality the allocation of pork barrel
spending is determined by incumbents, and the allocation of spending may affect
turnout. When there is only one incumbent, the vote-buying incentive would induce
him to distribute benefits toward municipalities with a lot of swing voters, while
the voter mobilization or turnout-buying incentive would induce him to distribute
benefits toward municipalities with a lot of supporters. Combining these effects,
a sole incumbent might favor neither swing municipalities nor core municipalities,
consistent with the weak correlation found in the data between the incumbent’s vote
share in a municipality and that municipality’s public expenditure in districts with
no PR representative.
However, when there are two incumbents who are able to distribute pork, the
mobilization incentive appears to dominate in the data. This could happen due to
an inference problem for voters in assigning credit to politicians bringing in pork-
barrel spending. When there are two incumbents, voters in swing municipalities
may not be able to identify the contribution of each incumbent to the increase
of public spending. Thus, the electoral return from distributing pork toward core
municipalities becomes higher relative to the benefit of distributing toward swing
municipalities.
Some additional empirical evidence supports such on interpretation. I estimate
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a specification similar to that in equation (2.3), but with the turnout rate in the
next election as the dependent variable. The municipal turnout rate is estimated
by using a municipality’s total number of valid votes cast divided by the voting age
population. When there are two incumbents, the turnout rates in the next election
are higher, particularly in municipalities that strongly favor either the SMD winner
or the runner-up. The quadratic relationship is plotted in Figure 2.7. A cubic
spline similar to those used in Figure 2.6 also confirms a bipolar impact of having a
PR representative on turnout. However, possibly due to a smaller sample size and
measurement errors in the turnout rate, the relationship between turnout rate and
a representative’s strength of support in a municipality is less precisely estimated
compared to the estimated effects on public expenditure.
When there are two incumbents, strongholds of either incumbent benefit from
greater local public expenditure. I argue that the intensified electoral competition
provides greater incentive for politicians to bring more public spending to their
core constituents. However, an alternative explanation is that electoral competition
induces the majority party or the governing coalition to distribute more public
spending to their core constituents. The governing coalition does so to protect their
SMD seats in districts they win or to contest for the SMD seats in districts they lose.
Because the candidates from the governing coalition are the SMD winners in some
districts and the runner-up in other districts, distributing more public spending
to the governing coalition’s strongholds may create a bipolar relationship between
public expenditure and the margin of vote share between SMD winners and runners-
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To assess this possibility, I calculate the municipal margin of vote shares be-
tween the candidate from the governing coalition with the highest vote share in the
district and the candidate from an opposition party with the highest votes share
in the district. I then re-estimate equation (2.3) using this alternative measure of
municipal margin. If the bipolar relationship found in Figure 2.6 is driven by the
governing coalition, there should not be a bipolar relationship between this new
municipal margin and public spending. In particular, having an additional repre-
sentative should only benefit municipalities where the governing coalition has strong
support. Results are plotted in Figure 2.8. As shown in the top left plot, there is
still a bipolar relationship between the new municipal margin and total municipal
expenditure when there are two incumbents. Both the strongholds of the governing
coalition (located on the right side of the plot) and the strongholds of the opposition
(located on the right side of the plot) benefit from having an additional represen-
tative. Similar relationships are found when the dependent variable is transfers
from the central government or infrastructure spending, and hold whether the fitted
polynomial is quadratic or cubic spline.
The analysis above supports the idea that electoral competition incentivizes
individual politicians in the quasi-randomized sample to bring in more public re-
sources to their core constituents. However, this is not to say parties will target
core constituents in all electoral situations. Note that the most competitive SMD
races are not likely to be included in the quasi-randomized sample. This is because
dual candidates who narrowly lose in SMD races are likely to rank very high on
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the PR seat of a losing candidate, or to create an extra PR seat for a district that
already has two representatives. Moreover, competition among parties for PR votes
in the (larger) PR blocks may not lead to targeting core supporters. As illustrated
in Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Milesi-Ferretti et al (2002), geographically tar-
geted spending may be less effective as an instrument for electoral competition when
the electoral system is based on the principle of proportional representation rather
than winner-take-all.
The analysis in this section adds to the literature of distributive politics by
highlighting the important distributional implications of whether the electoral com-
petition is among individual politicians or among parties. As summarized in Golden
and Min (2013), existing models are ambiguous about whether swing voters or core
voters would be targeted in distributive politics, and empirical evidence is mixed. In
the influential works of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Cox and McCubbins (1986),
and Dixit and Londregan (1996), parties and / or candidates are assumed to be
able to make credible commitments about their proposed distribution of spending
or transfers, and there is no agency problem between parties / candidates and voters.
The analysis in the section suggests that, when the primary actors in the electoral
competition are individual incumbents, it may not be appropriate to abstract from









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The empirical results in this paper suggest that political representation affects
the allocation of public expenditure. Having an additional incumbent legislator with
electoral interests in the district increases local public expenditure, in particular dis-
cretionary spending on public works. Heterogeneous districts benefit more from this
extra representation. Having a second representative elected to the legislature in-
tensifies subsequent electoral competition; nevertheless, this heightened competition
does not generate policy convergence, at least not in distributive policies toward lo-
cal governments. Instead, core supporters of both representatives in the district
receive a higher amount of transfers from the central government. Turnout-buying
may partially explain why swing voters are not targeted, despite contrary theoret-
ical arguments favoring targeting of swing voters. To obtain votes, politicians can
either attract votes from other candidates or they can turn out voters likely to vote
for them. The latter motive favors targeting core supporters in tactical spending.
While this paper focuses on how representation affects discretionary spending
in the short run, existing work suggest that partisan representation affects program-
matic redistributions over the median term. In the U.S., Levitt and Snyder (1995)
find that federal outlays are higher in districts with a large number of Democratic
voters, especially for programs that were initiated when the Democratic Party had
a large majority in Congress 10 to 15 years before the outlays and that are currently
administrated based on pre-established formulas. Brender and Drazen (2013) find
that replacement of political leaders affects the composition of public expenditures
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in the medium term, but not in the short term. This paper adds to the literature by
providing evidence that having extra representation could also provide short-term
discretionary spending benefit to voters with strong partisan or ideological affinity
with the added representative. This result suggests that the heterogeneity of an
electoral district is important for distributive policies, which has policy implications
for redistricting and the design of electoral systems.
Moreover, this paper documents a subtlety in Japan’s mixed-member elec-
toral system that makes representatives elected through party lists responsive to
geographically narrow interests. A large literature debates the relative merits of
two electoral systems: a Majoritarian system, such as in the U.S., and a Propor-
tional Representation system, as is common in Europe. Recent studies emphasize
the positive implications of the electoral system for public finance. Notably, Melesi-
Ferretti et al. (2002) argue that, relative to a PR system, a Majoritarian system
tends to spend more on goods and services vis-à-vis transfers. The rationale is that
spending on goods and services is easier to target toward geographic areas, while
transfers better target socio-economic groups. A middle ground may seem to be
a mixed Majoritarian–PR system, which is often thought to have the best of both
worlds and has been adopted by a number of new and existing democracies in the
recent decades, such as Taiwan and New Zealand. In this paper, I show that the
selection mechanism for PR representatives may compromise the supposedly broad
representation provided by PR representatives in a mixed system.
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